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INTRODUCTION
It is incontrovertible that the prohibition of the unilateral use of force
is a fundamental aspect of the United Nations (U.N.) era system for governing the relations between states.' Given this fact, the prohibition, as

University of Reading, UK. An important contribution was made to this Article by
Dino Kritsiotis, in that the initial idea underpinning it emerged from a conversation between
him and the author, which took place in a coffee shop in Ann Arbor, Michigan in the spring of
2005. The author would also like to acknowledge the extremely useful comments on earlier
drafts kindly provided by Sandy Ghandhi, Robert P. Barnidge, Jr., and Lawrence McNamara.
Finally, special thanks must go to Stephen Samuel for his invaluable research assistance.
Thus Henkin states that the prohibition "is the principal norm of international law
1.
of [the twentieth] century." Louis Henkin, The Use of Force:Law and U.S. Policy, in RIGHT V.
MIGHT: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 37, 38 (Louis Henkin et al. eds., 1991).

As Kennedy has phrased it, "the system of the United Nations Charter was more than a political regime of collective security-an institutional framework for diplomatic management of
conflict. It was also a new legal order that inaugurated a new law of war." DAVID KENNEDY,
OF WAR AND LAw 77 (2006). See also Christian M. Henderson, The 2006 National Security
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set out most crucially in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter,2 is often seen
as the archetypal example of ajus cogens norm (a "peremptory norm" of
general international law).' Certainly, an overwhelming majority of
scholars view the prohibition as having a peremptory character.4 Similarly, the International Law Commission (ILC) has taken this view' and
it is arguable that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has also done
SO.6 Indeed, one judge of the ICJ stated in an individual opinion that
"[t]he prohibition of the use of force.... is universally recognized as a
jus cogens principle, a peremptory norm from which no derogation is

Strategy of the United States: The Pre-Emptive Use of Force and the PersistentAdvocate, 15
TUL. J. COMP. & INT'L L. 1, 9 (2007).

2.
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
3.
Jus cogens norms may be broadly defined as "fundamental legal norms from which
no derogation is permitted." Hilary Charlesworth & Christine Chinkin, The Gender of Jus
Cogens, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 63, 63 (1993).
4.
Academic acceptance of this view is extremely widespread. Some examples include: JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 146 (2d ed.
2006); YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 99-104 (4th ed. 2005);
LAURI HANNIKAINEN, PEREMPTORY NORMS (JUS COGENS) IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT, CRITERIA, PRESENT STATUS 323, 356 (1988); MOHAMMAD TAGHI
KAROUBI, JUST OR UNJUST WAR? 108-09 (2004); LINDSAY MOIR, REAPPRAISING THE RESORT
To FORCE: INTERNATIONAL LAW, JUS AD BELLUM AND THE WAR ON TERROR 9 (2010); ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVIL1, PEREMPTORY NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 50 (2006); IAN
SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 215-16, 222-23 (2d ed.
1984); NICHOLAS J. WHEELER, SAVING STRANGERS: HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 44-45 (2000); Jonathan I. Charney, Anticipatory Humanitarian
Intervention in Kosovo, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 834, 837 (1999); Jochen A. Frowein, lus Cogens,
in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 8 (Riidiger Wolfrum ed.,

2009), available at http://www.mpepil.com (search "Quick Search" for "Ius cogens"; then
follow "lus cogens" hyperlink); Carin Kahgan, Jus Cogens and the Inherent Right to SelfDefense, 3 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 767, 777-81 (1997); Dino Kritsiotis, Reappraising
Policy Objections to HumanitarianIntervention, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1005, 1042-43 (1998);
Karen Parker & Lyn Beth Neylon, Jus Cogens: Compelling the Law of Human Rights, 12
HASTINGS INT'L. & CoMP. L. R. 411, 436-37 (1989); Natalino Ronzitti, Use of Force, Jus
Cogens and State Consent, in THE CURRENT LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE 147,

150 (A. Cassese ed., 1986); Oscar Schachter, In Defense of InternationalRules on the Use of
Force, 53 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 113, 129 (1986); Michael N. Schmitt, Computer Network Attack
and the Use of Force in InternationalLaw: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 885, 922 (1999); W Scholtz, The Changing Rules of Jus ad Bellum: Conflicts in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan, 7 POTCHEFSTROOM ELECTRONIC L.J. 1, 8-10 (2004);
Egon Schwelb, Some Aspects of InternationalJus Cogens as Formulatedby the International
Law Commission, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 946, 952 (1967); Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the
Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J. .INT'L L. 1, 3 (1999); Pamela J. Stephens, A Categorical Approach to Human Rights Claims: Jus Cogens as a Limitation on Enforcement?, 22 Wis.

L.J. 245, 253-54 (2004); Alfred Verdross, Jus Dispositivum and Jus Cogens in International Law, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 55, 60 (1966); Marjorie M. Whiteman, Jus Cogens in
InternationalLaw, with a ProjectedList, 7 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 609, 625 (1977). See also
INT'L.

Henderson, supra note 1, at 9-10, 10 n.63 (citing support from various academics).
5.
See infra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.

6.

See infra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
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permitted."7 This Article questions this widely held view: Is the prohibition of the use of force in fact ajus cogens norm?
It should be stressed at the outset that the position taken here is not
necessarily that the prohibition is a norm that has failed to achieve peremptory status. Instead, it is argued that there are significant difficulties
with such a conclusion and that, as a result, the widespread uncritical
acceptance of the prohibition as a jus cogens norm is concerning. The
aim of this Article is to test the prohibition against the criteria for the
establishment of peremptory status, and to then critically examine the
various problems that become apparent when one does so.
In simple terms, such problems can be condensed into two main issues. First, it may be argued that the inherent flexibility of, and
uncertainty surrounding, the law on the use of force (the jus ad bellum)
hinders any characterization of the prohibition of the use of force as a jus
cogens norm. Given commonly agreed conceptual understandings of
what jus cogens norms are, it is difficult to classify a norm that has a
variety of associated rules and sources, debated exceptions, and uncertain scope as having a peremptory character. Indeed, it is -questionable
whether it is possible to frame a workable jus cogens norm that encompasses the prohibition of the use of force at all.
Secondly, it is unclear whether there is enough evidence to establish
that the prohibition of the use of force is peremptory in nature. While
this has been almost universally accepted by scholars and, indeed, has
seemingly been affirmed by the ICJ, this Article takes the positivist position that jus cogens norms can only be created through the consent of
states, as evidenced by their practice. That a claim as to peremptory status is advanced by writers, however frequently, is not enough to turn an
"ordinary" norm of international law norm into a "supernorm" of jus
cogens. Thus, it must be asked whether states in fact accept the prohibition of the use of force as a peremptory rule.
At this preliminary stage, it is necessary to clarify that this Article
proceeds from the starting point that there does exist a category of
"higher" norms within the international legal system. The desirability of
peremptory norms, and, indeed, their very existence, has been questioned in the literature.! However, it is not the aim here to debate the
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Ter7.
ritory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 254 (July 9) (Separate Opinion of Judge Elaraby)
(emphasis added).
Various concerns over the desirability of jus cogens norms have been raised. Some
8.
writers have questioned the potentially negative impact of peremptory norms on the structure
and functionality of the international legal system. See, e.g., Prosper Weil, Towards Relative
Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 413 (1983) (arguing, inter alia, that an

approach to international law based on the values of the "international community" is dangerous as this does not reflect the reality of power structures within international relations, and
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existence of jus cogens norms per se. Without making a value judgment
as to the desirability of peremptory norms, the view taken here is that
there is enough evidence to suggest that states have accepted the general
notion of jus cogens and that there exist at least some basic conceptual
rules as to its content and operation.!
Scholars essentially fall into two broad camps on the issue of peremptory norms: those that debate the existence or functionality of jus
cogens norms'o and those who conceptually accept such norms" and
who, as a consequence, automatically accept the prohibition of the use of
force as being one of their number. 2 Broadly speaking, the present writer
falls into the second group of writers, who accept the existence of such
norms in principle, yet do not necessarily subscribe to the seemingly
that the concept of a "relative normativity" of legal norms will act to dilute the rigor and certainty unpinning the law). Others have debated the clarity and legitimacy of such norms. See,
e.g., Arthur M. Weisburd, The Emptiness of the Concept of Jus Cogens, as Illustratedby the
War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1 (1995) (taking the view that the confusion

between two theoretical approaches to the concept of jus cogens-one based on pure natural
law notions of "value," and one rooted in positivism-means that the concept is both unclear
and legally illegitimate, and that its application can lead to contradictory results). The political
motivations that underpin the concept of jus cogens have also been brought into question. See,
e.g., Robert P. Barnidge, Jr., Questioning the Legitimacy of Jus Cogens in the Global Legal
Order,38 ISR. YB. ON HUM. RTs. 199, 203-10 (2008) (arguing that 'jus cogens can operate in

a way in which the minority elite can control and monopolise the terms of legal debate").
More specifically, the political motivations and arbitrary selection that may be seen in the
categorization by scholars of particular rules as being peremptory (or not) has been highlighted as another concern. See, e.g., Charlesworth & Chinkin, supra note 3 (arguing that the
development and content of jus cogens norms have exhibited a gender bias); Anthony
D'Amato, It's a Bird, It's a Plane,It's Jus Cogens!, 6 CONN. J. INT'L L. 1 (1990) (expressing
concern at the propensity for scholars to view various rules of international law as being peremptory with little or no substantive basis, and the resulting "Pandora's Box approach to
supemorms"). Finally, a number of writers have questioned the very existence of jus cogens
norms, with reference to positivist conceptions of how international law is formed and developed. See, e.g., Gordon A. Christenson, Jus Cogens: Guarding Interests Fundamental to
InternationalSociety, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 585 (1988) (arguing, inter alia, that the concept of

jus cogens does not correlate with a positivist system based on the will of sovereign states, and
that peremptory norms are therefore, for the most part, merely aspirational); Michael J. Glennon, Peremptory Nonsense, in HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW: LIBER
AMICORUM Luzius WILDHABER 1265 (Stephan Breitenmoser et al. eds., 2007) (arguing that
the "core methodology" behind the jus cogens concept-which attempts to mix natural law

ideology with positivist underpinnings-is contradictory and incoherent).
For a summary of some of the supporting state practice, see HANNIKAINEN, supra
9.
note 4, 166-81; Kahgan, supra note 4, 773-75; Alexander Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms
and Reparationfor InternationallyWrongful Acts, 3 BALTIC YB. INT'L L. 19, 24 (2003).
10.
Ulf Linderfalk, The Effect of Jus Cogens Norms: Whoever Opened Pandora'sBox,
Did You Ever Think About the Consequences?, 18 EUR. J. INT'L L. 853, 855 (2007) (labeling
this group as the "skeptics").
I1.
Id. (labeling this group as the "affirmants").

12.

Thus, Ronzitti states that the prohibition of the use of force "is classified as a per-

emptory rule by all those who believe in the existence of jus cogens." Ronzitti, supra note 4, at

150.

Winter 2011]

The Prohibitionof the Use of Force as Peremptory?

219

resultant conclusion that the prohibition of the use of force possesses
peremptory status.
The aim in this Article is to test the claim that the prohibition of the
use of force is a peremptory norm and to set out the problematic aspects
of reaching a conclusion to that effect. Part I sets out the legal criteria for
identifying a peremptory norm of international law. Part II then considers the majority view-prevalent in the literature and alluded to in the
jurisprudence of the ICJ-that the prohibition of the use of force is a
peremptory norm. The question of whether the prohibition is suitable, or
even capable, of being viewed as a jus cogens norm is examined in Part
III. This part focuses on the relationship between the prohibition of the
use of force and the prohibition of the threat of force, the exceptions to
the prohibition, and the inherent flexibility and continuing development
of the jus ad bellum. All of these factors undermine a claim that the prohibition is peremptory. Finally, in Part IV, state practice is examined to
ascertain the extent to which states have accepted the peremptory status
of the prohibition. It is argued that while some states have certainly affirmed the view that the rule is a jus cogens norm, it is unclear whether
this acceptance has been enough to, in fact, confer peremptory status on
the prohibition.

I. IDENTIFYING A PEREMPTORY NORM
The most widely quoted definition of a jus cogens norm comes from
Article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: "[A]
peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and
recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a
norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified
only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same
character.""
Of course, using Article 53 as a definition of jus cogens is not entirely satisfactory. The Article relates to conflicts between peremptory
norms and treaties, not to jus cogens in the context of other legal
sources, such as customary international law. Therefore it may be argued
that it was not designed to act as a definition of the concept in general
terms.14 Indeed, the Article is clear that the definition is given "[flor the
13.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331. Complementing Article 53 is Article 64 of the Convention, which states: "If a new peremptory norm of general international law emerges, any existing treaty which is in conflict
with that norm becomes void and terminates." Id. art. 64.
14.
Erika de Wet, The Prohibition of Torture as an International Norm of Jus Cogens
and Its Implications for National and Customary Law, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 97, 98-99 (2004).
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purposes of the present Convention."" Moreover, as of November 2010,
only 111 states are party to the Convention, a little over half of all U.N.
member states." It is also noteworthy that of those, six states have made
minor reservations of differing types with regard to Article 53, although
none of these states exclude the Article's applicability per se."
Nonetheless, Article 53 offers a clear and legally posited starting
point for the wider international legal concept of jus cogens. Importantly,
it may be said that Article 53 now appears to have been accepted as the
key source for the content of jus cogens norms in a general sense.
Based on Article 53 and prevailing scholarly accounts of the character of peremptory norms, this Article proceeds on the basis that a jus
cogens norm is one that:
(1) Has the status of a norm of general international law;
(2) Is accepted and recognized by the international community of
states as a whole;
(3) Cannot be derogated from; and
(4) Can only be modified by a new norm of the same status.
These criteria will be returned to at various points throughout this
Article.

II. THE

MAJORITY VIEW: THE PROHIBITION AS PEREMPTORY

Before embarking on a critique of the claim that the prohibition of
the use of force is a jus cogens norm, it is worth setting out the majority
position in a little more detail.

15.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 13, art. 53.
16.
U.N. Secretary-General, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General, ch. 23, § 1, available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%2011/
Chapter%20XXIII/XXI-1.en.pdf.
See id. These states are Belgium, Russia, Japan, The Netherlands, Sweden, and the
17.
United States (note that the United States is a signatory but not a party to the Vienna Convention).
18.
HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 3. This can be seen as comparable to the way in
which Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, Jun. 26, 1945, 33
U.N.T.S. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute], is now viewed as the starting point for identifying the
sources of international law, irrespective of the fact that it was never intended to do anything
other than to provide a reference point for the sources that the Court could apply. See David
Kennedy, The Sources of International Law, 2 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POt'Y 1, 2, 2 n.3, 3
(1987).
This breakdown of the criteria in Article 53 is adapted from the one used by Kah19.
gan. Kahgan, supra note 4, at 775.
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It is understandable that a plethora of commentators have perceived
the prohibition as a peremptory norm,2 o if one subscribes to the view that
the concept of a "higher" group of peremptory rules within international
law is a desirable means of further limiting state behavior in certain
"fundamental" areas. One of the underlying rationales for the entire jus
cogens concept is the desire to impose some kind of fundamental standard of common values on state interaction and to strengthen the
21
effectiveness of international law in certain areas of common concern.
It is always worth remembering when considering the jus ad bellum that
the use of military force usually involves the systematic killing of human
beings, often on a vast scale. Forcible action is also obviously prone to
causing regional and global instability and inherent damage to international peace, security, and order.22 Indeed, many writers have likened jus
cogens norms to the historic value-based "natural law" approach to international legal theory,23 and the modern jus ad bellum has many of its
roots in the "just war" theory,24 an approach to warfare that is clearly
embedded in natural law thinking.25 Thus, jus cogens and the jus ad bellum share common natural law underpinnings such that one might view
them as a perfect conceptual fit.
In addition, the prohibition meets the first test for a jus cogens norm,
in that it is a norm of general international law.26 There is little doubt that
since 1945 states have viewed the prohibition of the use of force as a
cornerstone of the U.N. system and a crucial rule of international law.2 7
Indeed, the prohibition is universal in scope. This is in part because it is
20.

See supra note 4 and accompanying text.

21.
See, e.g., Alexander Orakhelashvili, The Impact of PeremptoryNorms on the Interpretation andApplication of United Nations Security Council Resolutions, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L.
59, 62 (2005); Erika de Wet, The InternationalConstitutionalOrder, 55 INT'L & Comp. L.Q.
51, 57-62 (2006); Lisa Yarwood, Jus Cogens: Useful Tool or Passing Fancy-A Modest Attempt at Definition, 38 BRACTON L.J. 16, 26-27 (2006).

22.
It is worth noting that the preamble to the U.N. Charter indicates that one of the
fundamental aims of the organization is "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of
war." U.N. Charter pmbl.
23.
See Mark W. Janis, The Nature of Jus Cogens, 3 CONN. J. INT'L L. 359, 361-63
(1988); Parker & Neylon, supra note 4, at 419-23.
See Joachim von Elbe, The Evolution of the Concept of Just War in International
24.
Law, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 665 (1939). See also MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A
MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 21-22, 51-73 (3d ed. 2000).
D. W. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 4-8 (1958) (noting the
25.

historical links between natural law and the right of self-defense in just war theory); Howard
M. Hensel, Theocentric Natural Law andJust War Doctrine, in

THE LEGITIMATE USE OF MIL-

ITARY FORCE: THE JUST WAR TRADITION AND THE CUSTOMARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT

5,

10-14 (Howard M. Hensel ed., 2008) (detailing the theocentric natural law basis for the use of
force).
For the legal "tests" to determine the existence of ajus cogens norm, see supra note
26.
19 and accompanying text.
27.

See supra note 1.
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present in the U.N. Charter," to which almost all states are party," but
also because the prohibition is an accepted rule of customary international law.o Therefore, all states are bound by the general requirement
not to use military force in their international relations. As such, it is
relatively clear that the prohibition meets the first requirement for a jus
cogens norm-it is a rule that can be identified as a "norm of general
international law."3'
Given these factors-the "fundamental" nature of the prohibition, its
natural law roots, its positivist pedigree of universal legal acceptance,
and its undeniable applicability to all states-it is no surprise that the
modern prohibition of forcible military action is generally viewed as an
32
archetypal rule of jus cogens. Representing this majority view, Orakhelashvili has stated: "The prohibition of the use of force by States
undoubtedly forms part of jus cogens.""
In 1966, for example, with regard to the drafting of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the ILC stressed in its commentary to
Article 50 (which ultimately became Article 53) that "the law of the
Charter concerning the prohibition of the use of force in itself constitutes
a conspicuous example of a rule in international law having the character
of jus cogens."34 More recently, in the context of the draft articles on
state responsibility, the Commission again noted in 2001 that "it is gen-

U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
28.
There are 192 member states of the U.N. (as of November 2010). For full list of
29.
member states, see Press Release, United Nations Member States, U.N. Press Release
ORG/1469 (July 3, 2006), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/
orgl469.doc.htm (U.N. member states are automatically "parties" to the U.N. Charter, as
membership requires states to "accept the obligations contained in the present Charter," U.N.

Charter art. 4, para. 1). Scholars have viewed the near universal membership of the U.N. as
evidence of the universal scope of the prohibition of the use of force. See, e.g., IAN
BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 113 (1963); JAI N.
SINGH, USE OF FORCE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAw 210 (1984).
30. MYRA WILLIAMSON, TERRORISM, WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE LEGALITY
OF THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST AFGHANISTAN IN 2001, at 103 (2009); NATALINO RoNzITTI,
RESCUING NATIONALS ABROAD THROUGH MILITARY COERCION AND INTERVENTION ON
GROUNDS OF HUMANITY, at XII (1985); Michael Bothe, Terrorism and the Legality of Preemptive Force, 14 EuR. J. INT'L L. 227, 228 (2003); Hermann Mosler, The InternationalSociety as a Legal Community, 140 RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 283 (1974 IV).

31.

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 13, art. 53.

32.

See examples cited supra note 4.
ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 4, at 50 (emphasis added).
Reports of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 21 U.N.

33.
34.

GAOR Supp. No. 9, pt. II, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev.l (1966), reprintedin [1966] 2 Y.B. Int'l L.
Comm'n 172, at 247, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.l. The ILC arguably reaffirmed
this view when it proceeded to set out a list of example jus cogens norms that had been proposed by its members, of which the prohibition of the use of force was the first. However, the
Commission did not explicitly endorse this list. See id. at 248.
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erally agreed that the prohibition of aggression is to be regarded as peremptory."35
The ICJ can also be said to have adopted this position. 6 In the 1986
Nicaraguacase, one of the first decisions of the Court to examine jus ad
bellum issues in any detail, the ICJ stated:

A further confirmation of the validity as customary international
law of the principle of the prohibition of the use of force expressed in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United
Nations may be found in the fact that it is frequently referred to
in statements by State representatives as being not only a principle of customary international law but also a fundamental or
cardinal principle of such law. The International Law Commission, in the course of its work on the codification of the law of
treaties, expressed the view that "the law of the Charter concerning the prohibition of the use of force in itself constitutes a
conspicuous example of a rule in international law having the
character of jus cogens."

It is the view of the present writer that the Court concluded here that
the prohibition of the use of force was a peremptory norm, although it
must be said that others have a different interpretation of this passage
from the Nicaraguacase." As can be seen from the quoted passage, the
35.
Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 53d Sess., Apr. 23-June 1,July 2-Aug. 10, 2001, at
283, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001).
36.
Judgments of the World Court are only legally binding in the case at hand and on
the parties to that case. See ICJ Statute, supra note 18, art. 59. However, the influence of a
decision of the Court stretches well beyond the particular dispute in question, in terms of the
wider perception of the judgment as constituting an authoritative interpretation of international
law. See ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How WE
USE IT 202-04 (1994); Natalia Ochoa-Ruiz & Esther Salamanca-Aguado, Exploring the Limits of InternationalLaw Relating to the Use of Force in Self-Defence, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 499,
501 (2005).

37.
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
Judgment on the Merits, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 190 (June 27) (citation omitted).
38.
Some scholars have argued that the Court did not in fact reach this conclusion, but
instead simply highlighted that the ILC had done so, to demonstrate that the prohibition was
an aspect of customary intemational law. See, e.g., Dinah Shelton, Righting Wrongs: Reparations in the Articles on State Responsibility, 96 AM. J. INT'L. L. 833, 843 (2002) (describing
the decision as avoiding recognition of peremptory norms). The present writer does not find

such a reading of the decision particularly persuasive; it is here argued that a better reading is
that the Court took the view that the prohibition was peremptory (evidencing this by reference
to the ILC's position) and used thisfact to support the universal customary nature of the norm.
ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 4, at 42 n.38. Or, as Byers has phrased this, the view is taken
here that the Court "quoted with approval" the position of the ILC. Michael Byers, Conceptualising the Relationship Between Jus Cogens and Erga Omnes Rules, 66 NORDIC J. INT'L L.
211, 215 (1997). Nonetheless, it is admittedly difficult to definitely conclude whether the
majority of the Court did or did not affirm the peremptory status of the prohibition in the
Nicaraguacase.
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ICJ at least referred to the view of the ILC that the prohibition was peremptory. Additionally, the Court went on to indicate that both Nicaragua
and the United States appeared to take this position in their respective
Memorial and Counter-Memorial. Strengthening the view that the
Court has interpreted the prohibition of the use of force as a peremptory
norm are statements made to this effect by judges in their individual
opinions attached to the Nicaragua case.40 Indeed, although the Court
has not, as a majority, affirmed this view since, a number of its judges
have also pointed to the "supernorm" status of the prohibition in their
individual opinions in other cases."
While acceptance of the peremptory status of the prohibition is near
universal, it is not entirely universal. There are, of course, the minority
of writers who object to the notion of jus cogens norms per se. Such
writers are unlikely to view the prohibition of the use of force as being
peremptory, for obvious reasons.42 More importantly for the purposes of
this Article, there are an even smaller number of writers who, while
seeming to accept the general concept of jus cogens norms, have questioned the peremptory status of the prohibition.4 ' The most notable
39.
Nicaragua v. United States, 1986 I.C.J. 190. See Memorial of Nicaragua, Nicaragua
v. United States, Merits, I.C.J. Pleadings, Vol. IV, 213 (Apr. 30, 1985); Counter-Memorial of
the United States of America (Questions of Jurisdiction and Admissibility) Nicaragua v. United
States, I.C.J. Pleadings, Vol. II, 314 (Aug. 17, 1984). However, it should be noted that Nicaragua's position as to the peremptory status of the prohibition was not entirely explicit, although
this is a reasonable inference from para. 213 of the Nicaraguan Memorial. See Memorial of
Nicaragua, Nicaragua v. United States, I.C.J. Pleadings, Vol. IV, 213.
Nicaragua v. United States, 1986 I.C.J. at 153 (Separate Opinion of Judge Nagendra
40.
Singh); id. at 199-200 (Separate Opinion of Judge Sette-Camara).
41.
See Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Merits, 2003 I.C.J. 161, 329-30 (Nov. 6) (Separate
Opinion of Judge Simma); id. at 260 (Separate Opinion of Judge Koojmans); id. at 291 (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Elaraby); Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 254 (July 9) (Separate
Opinion of Judge Elaraby).
See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GLENNON, LIMITS OF LAW, PREROGATIVES OF POWER: IN42.
TERVENTIONISM AFTER Kosovo 40-42 (2001) (explicitly rejecting the peremptory status of
the prohibition of the use of force based on skepticism of the validity of the entire jus cogens
concept); Weisburd, supra note 8, at 22, 44-50 (questioning the peremptory status of the prohibition as part of a wider argument to the effect that the concept jus cogens is overly vague
and thus both unclear and legally illegitimate); Barnidge, supra note 8, at 212 (referring alliteratively to "the purportedly peremptory prohibition on the use of force") (emphasis added).

Though it should be noted that elsewhere Barnidge seems to have at least tentatively accepted
the peremptory status of the prohibition. See ROBERT P. BARNIDGE, JR., NON-STATE ACTORS
AND TERRORISM: APPLYING THE LAW OF STAIE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE DUE DILIGENCE
PRINCIPLE 134 (2008).
43.
Having said this, of the scholars who do appear to question the peremptory status of
the prohibition, most only do so implicitly. See, e.g., TARCISIo GAZZINI, THE CHANGING
RULES ON THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 88-89 (2005) (discussing the implications for the development of the jus ad bellum "if the general ban on the use of force . . . is
considered as a peremptory norm") (emphasis added). The obvious implication here is that
Gazzini does not view such a conclusion as being self-evident. Others have explicitly ex-
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example of this kind is a 2007 article by Ulf Linderfalk.4 This paper importantly critiqued the claim that the prohibition is a norm of jus
cogens.45 However, even Linderfalk ultimately seemed willing to accept
that "the least controversial example of all [jus cogens norms] is the
principle of non-use of force ... I will assume that the principle of nonuse of force indeed to be a norm having a jus cogens character."46

III.

THE SUITABILITY OF THE PROHIBITION
AS A PEREMPTORY NORM

This Section questions whether the prohibition of the use of force is
suitable, or indeed even capable, of being viewed as a jus cogens norm.
The general position taken here is that the inherent uncertainty and flexibility of the prohibition would not seem to be compatible with the
conception of peremptory norms as set out in the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties. A related issue is that it is very difficult to conclude
exactly what the content of any avowed jus cogens norm would be. 47 IS
the jus cogens norm in question Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, the
prohibition of the use of force more specifically, the jus ad bellum in its
entirety, or a different mixture of these possibilities?
The concerns raised in this Section stem from a number of features
of the law on the use of force, namely: the conjoined relationship between the prohibitions of the use of force and the threat of force, the fact
that the prohibition has universally accepted exceptions to it, and the fact
that the jus ad bellum develops in a dynamic and flexible manner in
practice. These will be examined in turn.
A. The Problem of the Prohibitionof the Threat of Force

The prohibition of the use of force is enshrined in Article 2(4) of the
U.N. Charter as follows: "All Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
pressed some uncertainty as to the peremptory status of the prohibition without then going on
to discuss their apparent concerns. See, e.g., Andreas Laursen, The Use of Forceand (the State
of) Necessity, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 485, 525 (2004) ("Indications are that today, all use
of force is prohibited by a jus cogens norm, although this is not entirely clear."). However,

Laursen does not proceed to state why this is unclear.
44.
Linderfalk, supra note 10.
45.
Indeed, as one of the very few pieces of academic writing to consider some of the
concerns raised herein, Linderfalk's article, id., will be crucial for later analysis, particularly in
Part HI.B, infra.
46.
Linderfalk, supra note 10, at 859 (making the assumption that the prohibition is
peremptory as the starting point for a thought experiment, on the basis that this is such a
widely held view).
47.
Weisburd makes this general point in passing. Weisburd, supra note 8, at 21-22.
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political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations."48
Of the numerous writers who have attested to the peremptory nature
of the prohibition of the use of force, many have explicitly taken the
view that Article 2(4) is, in itself, a jus cogens norm. For example, Oscar
Schachter stated that: "[A]rticle 2(4) is the exemplary case of a peremptory norm." 49 For those who view the prohibition as jus cogens, this
might seem to be a logical position given that Article 2(4) is the principal
source for that rule.50
However, there are problems with this conclusion. Article 2(4) prohibits not only the use of force but also, in the same breath, the threat of
force. It must therefore be asked whether the avowed jus cogens norm
includes the threat of force in addition to its use.
Though this is not the place to examine the threat of force in international law in any detail," it is relatively uncontroversial to say that states
have not seen the prohibition of the threat of force in the same light as its
weightier counterpart, the prohibition of the use of force.5 2 Crucially, in
state practice, threats of force frequently occur without censure or even
comment.5 3 In contrast to the legal prohibition of the use of force, which
states inevitably reference and claim to adhere to even when breaching,
states, for the most part, threaten to use force and are threatened with
force without either party making any mention of the legal prohibition of
such conduct in Article 2(4).54 As such, it would seem reasonable to hold
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
48.
Schachter, supra note 4, at 129.
49.
E.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 85 ("The pivot on which the present-day jus ad
50.
bellum hinges is Article 2(4) of the Charter.").
There is comparatively little literature examining the prohibition of the threat of
51.
force, but some key texts include: NIKOLAS STORCHLER, THE THREAT OF FORCE ININTERNATIONAL LAw (2007); Dino Kritsiotis, Close Encounters of a Sovereign Kind, 20 EUR. J. INT'L
L. 299 (2009); Marco Roscini, Threats of Armed Force and Contemporary InternationalLaw,
54 NETH. INT'L L. R. 229 (2007); Romana Sadurska, Threats of Force, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 239

(1988).
As has been stated, "[t]he world community is generally, and quite rightly, more
52.
concerned with the use of armed force...." HILAIRE MCCOUBREY & NIGEL D. WHITE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT 56 (1992) (emphasis added). See also Sadurska,
supra note 51, at 248-60 (distinguishing the threat of force from the more serious use of force
in terms of state practice and opinio juris); Kritsiotis, supra note 51, at 302 (providing examples of the utilization of threats of force in state practice).
See Sadurska, supranote 51, at 239-40,257-60. However, for a contrary view, see
53.
Roscini, supra note 51, at 243-58.

Having said this, there are of course rare examples where states have explicitly
54.
argued that threats made against them have violated Article 2(4). For example, Iran made this
claim with regard to alleged threats of force coming from the United States in 2006. Permanent Rep. of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the U.N., Letter dated Mar. 17, 2006 from the
Permanent Rep. of Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the SecretaryGeneral, U.N. Doc. A/60/730 (Mar. 22, 2006). This example is highlighted by Kritsiotis, supra
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that the prohibition is far from a fundamental one. There has been almost
no customary international law development of the concept of the threat
of force and, as such, it has little legal content beyond its cameo appearance in Article 2(4)."
It would therefore be extremely difficult to conclude that the prohibition of the threat of force is a rule of jus cogens. If states are willing to
allow the prohibition to be breached without legal comment, this hardly
suggests that it is a rule that can be viewed as a "norm of general international law.",5 Less still can it be seen as "a norm from which no
derogation is permitted." 7 As Weisburd points out, "[i]f states violate the
norm, and other states seem able to live with the violations, is it hard to
see how the norm could be characterized as vital.""" As such, the claim
that Article 2(4) as a whole is a norm of jus cogens is a hard one to support.
Of course, it is not the case that all of those who have attested to
the peremptory status of the prohibition of the use of force have
equated this to ascribing peremptory status to Article 2(4) in its entirety.6 Some writers have taken the more nuanced view that it is the
prohibition of the use of force standing alone that has the character of jus
cogens.6 ' This version of the claim that the prohibition is peremptory
does not relate to Article 2(4) as such, other than to the extent that the
Article is a source for the professed peremptory rule. Instead, the focus
of the writers taking this approach is on the more specific rule that the

note 51, at 317-20, though it is worth noting that Kritsiotis also indicates that this response by
Iran is unusual and indicates the general scarcity of state reference to international law (or
Article 2(4) specifically) in the context of threats of force. Id. at 318.
55.
Although, a study of the practice can admittedly lead to some tentative conclusions
as to the possible customary international law content of the prohibition of the threat of force.
See STORCHLER, supra note 51, at 92-126.
56.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 13, art. 53.
57.

Id.

A. MARK WEISBURD, USE OF FORCE: THE PRACTICE OF STATES SINCE WORLD WAR
58.
II 22 (1997). Weisburd makes this point generally, not specifically with regard to the prohibition of the threat of force.
Having said this, Stiirchler makes this claim, and does so with specific reference to
59.
the prohibition of the threat of force, holding that "[i]t is . .. safe to conclude that article 2(4)
of the UN Charter is jus cogens as a whole, without distinction to be made between the threat
of force and the actual use of force." STORCHLER, supra note 51, at 63. In the view of the
present writer, this conclusion is incorrect, and it is notable that Stirchler goes on to say that
"certainty about the formal status of the no-threat principle [as jus cogens] does not remove
the uncertainty as to its content." Id.
60.
See, e.g., Parker & Neylon, supra note 4, at 436-37 (noting only the "international
rule prohibiting the use of force" in Article 2(4) as a norm of jus cogens according to ICJ case
law); Simna, supra note 4, at 3 (noting only "the prohibition enunciated in Article 2(4)" as a
rule ofjus cogens).

61.

See sources cited supra note 60.
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use of military force is prohibited; it is this rule alone that is viewed as
being peremptory.62
For the most part, those who adopt the view that the prohibition specifically is the jus cogens norm do not seem to make the distinction
between the prohibition and Article 2(4) with any reference to the inherent difficulty in ascribing peremptory status to the prohibition of the
threat of force. Of course, this rationale may be implicit. In any event,
the view that it is the prohibition of the use of force alone that is jus cogens-rather than Article 2(4) as a whole-would seem preferable as it
excludes the problematic issue of the threat of force, regardless of
whether the writers taking this approach have acknowledged this.
Isolating the prohibition of the use of force as a peremptory norm,
however, brings with it a different problem. The threat and use of force
are inherently conjoined concepts as they currently exist in international
law. Indeed, they are linked by more than simply the fact that they share
lodgings in Article 2(4); the lawfulness of any threat of force is dependent upon the lawfulness of the use of force threatened.6 ' The ICJ
confirmed this in its Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons
advisory opinion in 1996.64 Indeed, in the Nicaraguacase, the Court held
that the prohibitions of the use and threat of force are, in legal terms,
substantively equal.
If a breach of the two norms is substantively the same in law and if
one is willing to accept that a use of force is a breach of a jus cogens
norm, this would suggest that the prohibition of the threat of force must
have the same status. It is somewhat difficult to divorce the threat of
force from the use of force. Further, Article 2(4) is, as has already been
noted, the principal source for the prohibition of the use of force.66 To
hold that some elements of that provision have a peremptory character
but not all of them, particularly given that the ICJ has been clear that the
two prohibitions must be taken together, would leave the jus cogens
norm somewhat disjointed. Indeed, the content of the peremptory norm
would not match the content of the provision of law from which it is said
to be derived: Article 2(4).
Having said all of this, such a fissure in Article 2(4) is not in itself a
bar to the peremptory status of the prohibition of the use of force. The
presence of the prohibition of the threat of force may mean that Article
62.

63.
64.

See id.
BROWNLIE, supra note 29, at 364; DINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 86.
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.

22, 1 47 (July 8).
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
65.
Judgment on the Merits, 1986 I.C.J. 14,1 227 (June 27).
66.
See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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2(4) cannot in its entirety form a jus cogens norm, but it does not prevent
the prohibition of the use of force standing alone from meeting the criteria for a peremptory rule of international law. In spite of the ICJ's
assertions to the contrary, it has already been argued here that the ban on
the threat of force is not, in state practice, a norm of equal standing to
the actual use of force." Thus, while it may not be desirable-in terms of
clarity-for a norm of jus cogens to derive from half of a legal provision,
the separation of the threat and use of force would be far from a terminal
blow to the peremptory status of the norm. Far more damaging is the fact
that the prohibition of the use of force is a rule subject to exceptions. It is
to this issue that the Article now turns.
B. The Problem of the Exceptions to the Prohibition
A jus cogens norm is one from which no derogation is permitted.
Yet, in the case of the prohibition of the use of force, exceptions to the
rule not only exist, but are built into the very nature of the U.N. system:
"[Tihe rule prohibiting force is not an absolute rule, against which all
contrary actions can be judged. We are dealing here with a general
rule-that is a rule that admits or is open to exceptions-which appear in
the form of justifications for action."
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter permits states to use force in selfdefense "if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations" and Article 42 allows the U.N. Security Council to authorize
the use of force if it feels that such authorization is necessary, having
identified a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" under Article 39.69 In either case-self-defense or collective
security-the prima facie unlawfulness of the use of force is precluded.
Therefore, if one accepts the aforementioned criteria for establishing
jus cogens norms, it would seem that the rule set out in Article 2(4) is
not a peremptory norm of jus cogens. This remains true even if one takes
the more nuanced approach of identifying the prohibition of the use of
force as a stand alone norm divorced from the threat of force. Simply
put, the prohibition of the use of force is a rule from which derogation is
explicitly and uncontrovertibly permitted. Thus, "the relevant jus cogens
norm cannot possibly be identical with the principle of non-use of force
as such. If it were, this would imply that whenever a state exercises a

See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
Dino Kritsiotis, When States Use Armed Force, in THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 45, 49 (Christian Reus-Smit ed., 2004) (citations omitted).
67.
68.

69.

See U.N. Charter arts. 39, 42, 51.
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right of self-defense, it would in fact be unlawfully derogating from a
norm of jus cogens."'0
To take a treaty-based example, if one were to take the view that the
prohibition of the use of force is, even standing alone, a peremptory
norm, then the North Atlantic Treaty would be instantly void. Article 5
of that Treaty obliges the parties to take "such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force" in response to an armed attack on
one or more of their number." Thus, NATO would fall foul of Article 53
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Needless to say, treaties formalizing regional arrangements for the lawful exercise of the
right of self-defense are not contrary to jus cogens in this way.
However, the fact that the prohibition of the use of force has agreed
exceptions does not necessarily bar the norm from peremptory status as
long as one is willing to see the rule in more expansive terms than it appears in Article 2(4). If the norm being discussed here were framed in a
way as to additionally include the exceptions to the prohibition, then its
peremptory character could be preserved. In other words, "[a] correct
description of the norm would have to account for the fact that the principle of non-use of force does have exceptions."
In his seminal book on peremptory norms, Alexander Orakhelashvili
deals with this problem (without, admittedly, noting that any such problem exists) by concluding that "the jus ad bellum as a whole is
peremptory." 74 In other words, Orakhelashvili takes the view that it is not
simply the prohibition of the use of force that is peremptory, but it is also
all of the rules on the use of force under international law, including the
rules governing self-defense and the rules on forcible action as authorized by the Security Council.
Although such an approach deals with the issue of the bothersome
exceptions, the sweeping claim that the entirety of the jus ad bellum is
peremptory is itself problematic. In part, this is because of the inter70.
Linderfalk, supra note 10, at 860. Sinclair and Kritsiotis also note this point, yet
ultimately appear to accept the peremptory character of the prohibition. See SINCLAIR, supra
note 4, at 215-16, 222-23; Kritsiotis, supra note 4, at 1043.
71.
North Atlantic Treaty art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243. It has
been considered with regard to the NATO action in Kosovo in 1999, which was undeniably a
use of military force-indeed, one that would be difficult to see as an act of self-defensewhether "[a]ny treaty that provided the basis for NATO's action would, under the doctrine [of
jus cogens}, bc void ab initio." Glennon, supra note 8, at 1271.
72.
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 13, art. 53. See also id.
art. 64 (stating that an existing treaty becomes void if a new conflicting jus cogens norm
emerges). An Article 64 nullification would depend on whether the prohibition of the use of
force was seen to have taken on a peremptory character before or after NATO came into existence.
Linderfalk, supra note 10, at 860.
73.
74.
ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 4, at 51.
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twined nature of the legal rules governing the use of force." The jus ad
bellum is made up of a large number of rules, which interrelate with each
other to varying degrees. It would seem impossible to conclude that a
single norm could be articulated to cover every element of the law on the
use of force. A better interpretation of this claim, then, might be that the
jus ad bellum represents a collection of interrelated peremptory norms.
This would amount to a 'jus cogens network" of norms, all of which
would act, together, to "trump" lesser areas of international law. 6
Adopting either approach, there remains a further issue, which is essentially the same problem that was encountered earlier with regard to
the threat of force. The numerous rules that make up the jus ad bellum
possess different functions and varying levels of obligation. For many of
these rules, it would be extremely difficult to make a case for peremptory
status. If certain rules of the jus ad bellum cannot be seen as meeting the
criteria for jus cogens norms, then the body of law as a whole (taken either as a single norm or as a group of norms) cannot be seen as
peremptory. Thus, Orakhelashvili's claim as to the holistic peremptory
status of the jus ad bellum is a difficult one to support.
For example, consider the requirement that states report any actions
taken in self-defense to the Security Council.n This requirement is contained in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter78 and is clearly a rule of the jus
ad bellum. However, it is also uncontroversial that the reporting requirement is not mandatory in the sense that a failure to report is not
determinative as to the unlawfulness of a self-defense action.7 1 To put
75.
Making a similar point, Barnidge has stated (although admittedly not specifically in
relation to the law on the use of force): "When can it be said . . . that a norm exists, as distinct
and independent from similar norms?" Barnidge, supra note 8, at 202.
76.
See Kahgan, supra note 4, at 794 (alluding to "a regime concerning the use of
armed force in interstate relations from which states are not free to derogate") (emphasis added). However, having concluded that the right of self-defense is peremptory, Kahgan seems
unsure whether this should be viewed as part of a composite jus cogens norm, or a separate
and independent peremptory rule under this broader jus cogens regime. See id. at 791.
Glennon uses a different example to make a similar point. Instead of the reporting
77.
requirement related to self-defense, he considers the powers of the Security Council under the
Charter: "Why should the Charter's limits on the right of the Security Council to use forceset out in Articles 2(7) and 39-not also be seen as jus cogens, since those provisions are,
after all, part of the same regime for the centralization of power that subsumes Article 2(4)?"
GLENNON, supra note 42, at 42.
U.N. Charter art. 51.
78.
79.
See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
Judgment on the Merits, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 200 (June 27) (noting that reporting to the Security
Council is not a condition of lawfulness in the context of a purely customary international law
claim of self-defense). With regard to self-defense claims made under the U.N. Charter, the
Court did indicate that "it is to be expected that the conditions of the Charter should be respected." Id. However, the use of the word "should" by the Court in this context suggests that
even with regard to self-defense claims under the Charter, it is not the case that the reporting
requirement must be respected. See also Don W. Greig, Self-Defence and the Security
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this differently, a failure to report may be indicative of an unlawful use
of force, but it certainly does not confirm one. It would be nonsensical to
argue that such a rule is one that cannot be derogated from when it is
generally accepted that it can be without any meaningful legal consequence. Similarly, this writer is comfortable in making the assumption
that it would be difficult to find even one state that would hold that the
"reporting requirement" is a peremptory rule, let alone enough states to
equate to "the international community .. . as a whole."o Thus, as Christenson correctly and categorically states: "[T]he requirement to report
immediately to the Security Council any use of force in self-defense is
not part of the customary norm of jus cogens.""
Dismissing the view that the entirety of the jus ad bellum may be
seen as peremptory, then, it is necessary to turn to the similar, but more
palatable, solution that has been advanced by a relatively small number
of scholars. This solution is to broadly define the jus cogens norm to encompass the exceptions to the prohibition, without going so far as
incorporating the entire law on the use of force." In other words, the jus
cogens norm could be framed to include the "fundamental" rules of selfdefense and Security Council authorized action, but not the "nonfundamental" jus ad bellum rules that are clearly not peremptory, such as
the reporting requirement.

Council: What Does Article 51 Require?, 40 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 366, 387-88 (1991) (taking

a purposive approach to the reporting requirement, and referencing the position taken by the
ICJ in Nicaragua,in the wider context of an examination of the relationship between the Security Council and Article 51).
80.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 13, art. 53.
Gordon A. Christenson, The World Courtand Jus Cogens, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 93, 99
81.
(1987) (emphasis added).
82.
Writers adopt this approach in different ways. See HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4,
329-33, 340-49 (distinguishing a peremptory prohibition of "aggressive" force from lawful
uses of force, which he sees as not being covered by the jus cogens rule); BRIAN D. LEPARD,
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A NEW THEORY WITH PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS 7, 38
(2010) (stating that it is only the prohibition of "the nondefensive use of force by one state
against another" that is peremptory in character); Davis Brown, Use of Force Against Terrorism After September 11th: State Responsibility, Self-Defense and Other Responses, 11
CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 19 n. 85 (2003) (arguing that self-defense is a jus cogens

norm); Kahgan, supra note 4, at 791 (arguing that the right of self-defense is part of the peremptory rule or even perhaps an additional peremptory rule); Linderfalk, supranote 10, at 860
(arguing that aspects of the exceptions to the prohibition must be included in the peremptory
norm); Ronzitti, supra note 4, at 150 (taking the view that the peremptory norm does not directly correspond to the prohibition as contained in Article 2(4) but is instead a peremptory
prohibition of unlawful uses of force. In particular, he argues that the peremptory norm does
not cover force used with the consent of the state in which it is deployed). For a contrary view,
see DINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 181 (arguing that it is, at best, extremely unclear whether selfdefense can be considered jus cogens).
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However, once one begins to attempt to frame such a norm, it
quickly becomes apparent that this process is far from easy. Taking a
simple approach, one could hold that it is a norm of jus cogens that:
The use of armed force directed against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any state or which is in any other
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the U.N. is prohibited
other than when it is employed in conformity with Article 51 of
the U.N. Charter or when lawfully authorized by the Security
Council under Article 42 of the U.N. Charter.83
Such a formulation is far from satisfactory. This is because, for example, self-defense is governed by the rules of necessity and
proportionality. Despite near-universal acceptance of this fact,' these
criteria do not appear in Article 51 at all. Instead, they derive from customary international law." In contrast, the "non-fundamental" norm of
reporting actions to the Security Council is found in Article 51, as has
been noted.
Again, a problem of "selection" is encountered when an attempt is
made to form ajus cogens norm in this context. To put this differently, it
has been argued above that a "pure," streamlined norm here will not suffice; the prohibition in itself cannot be peremptory, as it is subject to
exceptions. Equally, it is impossible to take the approach of throwing
any and all associated rules into the supernorm mixture; to do so would
mean elevating the threat of force or the reporting requirement or any
number of other minor or procedural rules to fundamental peremptory
status.
Thus, the nature of jus cogens, when combined with the nature of the
jus ad bellum, means that one is forced to "cherry pick" certain rules or
criteria to compile a workable norm. It is not adequate to simply refer to
the relevant provisions of the U.N. Charter, given that a number of the
crucial rules come from customary international law.
In attempting to produce a definition of the purported jus cogens norm concerning
83.
the use of force, this Article adopts a similar approach to that taken by Linderfalk to highlight
the problem raised in this Section. He too produced a number of possible definitions of the
norm, although those used in this Article differ in a number of respects from those that he
employs. See Linderfalk, supra note 10, at 860, 865, 867.
84.

See

A. ALEXANDROV, SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST
19-27 (1996); JUDITH GARDAM, NECESSITY,

STANIMIR

THE USE OF FORCE IN

LAw

PROPORTIONALITY AND

INTERNATIONAL

6, 10-11 (2004); Oscar Schachter, Implementing Limitations
on the Use of Force: The Doctrine of Proportionality and Necessity: Remarks, in 86 AM.
Soc'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 39, 39 (1992).
On the customary nature and origins of the criteria of necessity and proportionality,
85.
THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES

see James A. Green, Docking the Caroline: Understanding the Relevance of the Formula in
Contemporary Customary InternationalLaw Concerning Self-Defense, 14 CARDOZO J. INT'L

& CoMP. L. 429 (2006).
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Ultimately, to provide a sufficiently detailed rule, it is necessary to
articulate a norm so lengthy that it is unwieldy to the point of losing
worth. Take, for example:
The use of armed force directed against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any state or which is in any other
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the U.N. is prohibited
other than when it is employed in a necessary and proportional
manner in response to an armed attack by another state against a
member of the U.N. or when authorized by the Security Council
under Article 42 of the U.N. Charter, following a threat to the
peace and breach of the peace or an act of aggression as determined by the Security Council.
A norm of this kind is obviously unclear by simple virtue of its
length and the number of clauses and sub-clauses that form it. These difficulties are compounded when it is considered that there is no single
source for such a norm. Instead it is compiled by reference to Article
2(4), Article 51, Article 42, Article 39, and, of course, customary international law. The lack of clarity here is surely undesirable for a
"fundamental" peremptory norm.
These already rather murky waters are muddied still further when
one considers that the rules of the jus ad bellum, particularly those that
make up the right of self-defense, are notoriously debated and unclear in
themselves. Take, for example, the criteria of necessity and proportionality. These requirements are almost universally accepted in terms of their
legal validity." Thus, a plausible case could be made for their peremptory status. Certainly, the right of self-defense cannot be peremptory if
these criteria are not, as they form its core. Yet despite their universal
acceptance, necessity and proportionality remain poorly defined criteria,
the content of which may be most favorably described as extremely
flexible." States are prone to repeatedly debating what is necessary or
proportional in any given case, with only extreme examples of unnecessary action or disproportionality giving rise to any firm consensus."
86.
87.
88.

See supra note 83.
See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
JAMES A. GREEN, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND SELF-DEFENCE IN

INTERNATIONAL LAW

106-07 (2009).

89.
A representative example of the common practice in this context is the South African interventions in Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Botswana in 1986. Here, states disagreed over
whether the attacks were "necessary" under the circumstances, but it was generally agreed that
this was the legal test. South Africa viewed the attacks as necessary on the basis that it had
repeatedly warned the states in question that they would be attacked if they continued to aid
African National Congress insurgents. See U.N. SCOR, 2684th mtg. at 22, U.N. Doc.
S/PV.2684 (May 22, 1986). In contrast, certain other states felt the attacks were unnecessary
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Perhaps even more problematically, there are entire areas of the jus
ad bellum that are fiercely contested by states. Take, for example, the
avowed rights of anticipatory and pre-emptive self-defense."o Some
states have consistently argued that there exists a right to use force in
self-defense even before the occurrence of an armed attack, if such an
attack is imminent (anticipatory self-defense)." Other states have hotly
disputed this claim.92 To this can be added the fact that it has also been
argued-most notably by the United States-that military action may
be taken even before the potential attack can be identified as being
imminent (pre-emptive self-defense). There is no consensus among
states or writers as to the legal validity of these possible manifestations
of self-defense. As such, any definition of a jus cogens norm concerning

given that negotiations for a peaceful resolution were ongoing within the Commonwealth
Group. See, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 2685th mtg. at 4-6, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2685 (May 23, 1986)
(documenting Australia expressing particular disapproval of South Africa's actions). A more
recent example, concerning proportionality, is the Israeli action directed at Hezbollah, in
Lebanon, in 2006. This action was seen by some states as disproportional. See, e.g., U.N.
SCOR, 5493d mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5493 (Resumption 1) (July 21, 2006) (documenting the Russian Federation asserting that "the scale of the use of force" by Israel has gone
"far beyond a counterterrorist operation"). Israel, unsurprisingly, did not view it this way.
See Responding to Hizbullah Attacks from Lebanon: Issues of Proportionality, ISR.
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF.(July 25, 2006), http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Law/

Legal+Issues+and+Rulings/Responding+to+Hizbullah+attacks+from+Lebanon-+Issues+of
+proportionality+ July+2006.htm. Again, then, there was agreement over the applicability
of the proportionality criterion, but a disagreement as to its application to the facts.
The term "anticipatory self-defense" is used here to refer to military action taken in
90.
response to an imminent threat, while "pre-emptive self-defense" is used to denote action
taken in response to a perceived threat that is not imminent. However, it is important to note
that the terminology with regard to the concept of self-defense in response to a threatimminent or non-imminent-is inconsistent in the wider literature: the terms used here are
merely those preferred by the present author. In any event, the example of "anticipatory selfdefense" is also used by Linderfalk to illustrate the problem of ascribing peremptory status to
jus ad bellum rules. Linderfalk, supra note 10, at 861. For a useful overview of the main arguments concerning anticipatory and pre-emptive self-defense, see JACKSON NYAMUYA
MAOGOTO, BATTLING TERRORISM: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE USE OF FORCE AND THE WAR

111-49 (2005).
91.
For example, this claim has been made by Israel, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom, amongst other states. See, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 2288th mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2288
(June 19, 1981) (Israel); U.N. SCOR, 464th mtg. at 25, U.N. Doc. S/PV.464 (Feb. 8, 1950)
(Pakistan); U.N. SCOR, 464th mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. S/PV.831 (July 17, 1958) (U.K.).
92.
Take, for example, the state response to Israel's claim that it was acting in anticipatory self-defense against the Iraqi Osiraq reactor in 1981, where twenty-five individual states
addressed letters of condemnation regarding the attack to the President of the Security Council. See U.N. Docs. S/14512-S/14560 (June 9-19, 1981).
93.
A concept articulated by the United States in 2002. See THE WHITE HOUSE, THE
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2002), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf. For discussion, see Christine Gray, The US National
ON TERROR

Security Strategy and the New "Bush Doctrine" on Pre-Emptive Self-Defense, 1
OF INT'L L. 437, 440-43 (2002); Henderson, supra note 1.
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the prohibition of the use of force would have to include a phrase along
the lines of:
. . . in response to an armed attack by another state against a

member of the U.N., or possibly a potential armed attack, if imminent, or possibly any potential armed attack, even if not
imminent (it all depends on your reading of Article 51 and its interpretation, as one perceives it, in customary international law)
94

Self-defense in response to a mere threat of force-either imminent
or potential-is just one such example of controversy within the law governing self-defense. There are others. 5 The fundamental question here,
then, is: Can a jus cogens norm exist when its scope and the parameters
for its application are so debated? The flexible, and in some cases fervently contested, rules on the use of force hardly sit well with the notion
of "a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of
States as a whole."96
Again, this is not to say that it is impossible to devise a jus cogens
norm that equates to the prohibition of the use of force as it appearsexceptions and all-in current international law. However, it must be
acknowledged that any such norm would necessarily be rather lengthy in
its formulation, would derive from a number of sources, and would, to
put it in the best light, be prone to some internal contradictions and debated elements. "Given the extent and virulence of the debate on such
issues as the meaning of Article 2(4) and that of the terms armed attack
and the inherent right of self-defense in article 51 of the United Nations
Charter, significant questions of interpretation remain."
C. The Problem of the Development of the Law
on the Use of Force
Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties makes it
clear that once a norm takes on the character of jus cogens, it can only be
altered by "a subsequent norm of general international law having the
same character."" If it is assumed that the prohibition of the use of force
94.

See supra note 83.

For example, Corten uses the concept of "humanitarian intervention" to briefly
95.
illustrate this point, as well as referring to anticipatory self-defense. Olivier Corten, The Controversies Over the Customary Prohibition on the Use of Force: A Methodological Debate, 16
EUR. J. INT'L L. 803, 819 (2005).
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 13, art. 53.
96.
Kahgan, supra note 4, at 798. Kahgan nonetheless is ultimately clear that she views
97.
both the prohibition of the use of force and the right of self-defense as peremptory in nature.
Id. at 825-27.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 13, art. 53.
98.
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(plus its exceptions) has been established as a peremptory norm, then the
rules of the jus ad bellum-or at least those of its rules that had been
selected to form the peremptory norm-would be forever frozen in time,
unless they were to be altered by a change that was also agreed as peremptory by the community as a whole.
It is submitted here that such a stifling restriction on the development of the jus ad bellum would not concord with the reality of the law
on the use of force. The rules of the jus ad bellum, particularly the exceptions to the general prohibition, are notoriously flexible.99 This was
noted, for example, with regard to the criteria of necessity and proportionality in the context of self-defense.'"' Moreover, the rules of the jus
ad bellum are flexible because states like it that way. As Cassese has

stated, the use of military force and issues of national security "are areas
where states, both great and middle-sized, deliberately leave law in a
condition of inexactitude and uncertainty, if not ambiguity, making it
easier for them to protect their own interests.',0 ' In other words, the system as it stands allows for the legal elasticity required to adapt to the
changing world of security threats and forcible action.02
A useful example is the issue of whether an "armed attack" for the
purposes of self-defense must be attributable to a state, or whether it is
lawful to respond to attacks by non-state actors.'03 Currently, under customary international law, the position is probably still that an armed
attack must emanate from a state, at least to some degree.' However, in
recent years, changes in state practice have suggested that there may be
the beginnings of a paradigm shift in the customary international law
99.
MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 592-94 (2005).
100.
See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
101.
ANTONIO CASSESE, VIOLENCE AND LAW IN THE MODERN AGE 39 (Stephen J.K.
Greensleaves trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1988).
102.
As Koskenniemi has put this: "It is not that definitions would be impossible-they
are undesirable in view of the complexity of the international social world." KOSKENNIEMI,
supra note 99, at 594. Here, Koskenniemi references a number of flexible legal concepts that
it would be undesirable to define too rigidly, including the concept of self-defense. See id.
This example is briefly raised by Linderfalk in the context of the peremptory status
103.
of the prohibition of the use of force; however, he does not use this example in the same way,
or draw the same conclusions with regard to it, as does the present author. See Linderfalk,
supra note 10, at 862-63.
104.
See, e.g., GAZZINI, supra note 43, 184-91; Ian Scobbie, Words My Mother Never
Taught Me: In Defense of the InternationalCourt, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 76, 80-81 (2005). See
also Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 139 (July 9) (seeming to hold a similar position regarding "armed attack" under U.N. Charter art. 51); Armed Activities on the Territory of the
Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Merits, 2005 I.C.J. 116, 146 (Dec. 19) (noting that
Uganda's claim of self-defense was against armed attacks not attributable to the Democratic
Republic of the Congo).
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toward allowing forcible actions taken in self-defense against non-state
actors.os Equally, despite the contentions of some writers,"" it would
seem unlikely that the practice has yet been sufficiently widespread or
uniform to constitute a new customary international law rule to this effect.107
It would thus be hard to say that this adaptation of the law governing
self-defense is peremptory at the current time, because there is not yet
even enough state agreement to be able to conclusively hold that it represents a clear "ordinary" customary rule. Yet, unlike the reporting
requirement previously discussed, this is not merely a procedural rule.
The question of which actors can commit an armed attack strikes at the
very fundamentals of the right of self-defense. If one accepts selfdefense as part of the jus cogens rule, then one must also accept its current form as the basis for the peremptory norm. As the law currently
stands, this includes the rule that force cannot be used in response to an
attack orchestrated by non-state actors without a degree of state involvement. Of course, there is nothing to stop the arguably emerging
rule that self-defense can be taken against non-state actors from becoming peremptory in the future. This would require any such legal
development to be accepted by the community as a whole as being peremptory, leading to an alteration of the existing norm.
However, the kind of consensus necessary to constitute a peremptory
norm is difficult to reach even for more established (not to mention
clearer) legal rules.0 o Moreover, any instance where a state took forcible
action in response, for example, to a non-state terrorist attack at the current time would necessarily constitute a breach of the existing jus cogens
norm. Although there does not seem to be enough state practice as yet to
confirm that self-defense may be taken against non-state actors under
105.
See Michael Byers, Terrorism, the Use of Force and International Law After 11
September, 51 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 401, 407-09 (2002).
106.
See, e.g., Raphael van Steenberghe, Self-Defence in Response to Attacks by NonState Actors in the Light of Recent State Practice 23 LEIDEN J. OF INT'L L. 183 (2010); Kimberley N. Trapp, Back to Basics: Necessity, Proportionalityand the Right of Self-Defence
Against Non-State Terrorist Actors, 56 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 141, 147-55 (2007). See also
Thomas M. Franck, Terrorism and the Right of Self-Defense, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 839, 840

(2001) (arguing that the Charter does not limit the inherent right of self-defense to attacks by
state actors).
107.
See Byers, supra note 105, at 407-09.
108.
As Rozakis rightly states, the criteria for the formation or moderation of jus cogens
norms as set out in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties "are quite
severe." CHRISTOs L. RoZAKIs, THE CONCEPT OF JUS COGENS IN THE LAW OF TREATIEs 15
(1976). Rozakis goes on to examine these criteria in some detail. Id. at 52-84. Compare, for
example, the uncertainty over the peremptory status of the prohibition of genocide (or at least
certain aspects of that prohibition). David Lisson, Note, Defining National Group in the Genocide Convention: A Case Study of Timor-Leste, 60 STANFORD L. REV. 1459, 1463 (2008).
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customary international law, it is equally not the case that states have
viewed recent forcible responses against non-state actors as being a
breach of a jus cogens norm. Indeed, there has been an increasing
amount of support for such actions.' 9
The concern as to the development of the jus ad bellum relates not
only to the exception of self-defense, but to other crucial areas of the law
on the use of force as well. Consider the concept of what may be called a
"cyber-attack": a technological attack on a state's computer networks.
Such attacks are now becoming an increasing feature of inter-state relations.no Yet, there is currently no consensus as to whether cyber-attacks
are, or should be, considered a use of "force" as prohibited by Article
2(4). It has long been relatively clear that uses of "economic" or "political" force are not covered by that provision."' However, debate is
ongoing as to whether a cyber-attack is similarly beyond the scope of the
prohibition. Some writers take the view that cyber-attacks should not be
considered as being covered by the prohibition of the use of force on the
basis that the rule as it stands prohibits armed force only. As cyberattacks have more in common with economic attacks in that they are not
"physically" or "kinetically" manifested in the same way as military action, they should not be included.' 2 Others take the contrary position that
109.
For example, the majority of states accepted Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001,
in spite of the fact that the action was taken in response to an attack perpetrated by a non-state
terrorist group. For detailed lists of the states that condoned the intervention expressly and/or
offered support, see DAVID J. GERLEMAN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31152, OPERATION ENDURING

FREEDOM:

FOREIGN

PLEDGES OF MILITARY

&

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

(2001), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/6207.pdf; HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY (U.K.), RESEARCH PAPER 01/81, OPERATION Enduring Freedom AND THE
CONFLICT IN AFGHANISTAN: AN UPDATE 31 (2001) available at http://www.parliament.uk/
commons/lib/research/rp200l/rpOl-081.pdf.
110.
GUARDIAN

See Ewen MacAskill, New Cyber Security Chief Warns of Internet Attacks, THE
(U.K.), Apr. 15, 2010, at 28; Age of Cyber Warfare is "Dawning", BBC NEWS,

Nov. 17, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/technology/8363175.stm. In particular, cyberwarfare is becoming a notable aspect of international relations in former Soviet regions. Thus,
it was an important feature of the August 2008 armed conflict between Russia and Georgia.
See 2 INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL FACT-FINDING MISSION ON THE CONFLICT IN GEORGIA
217-19 (2009), available at http://www.ceiig.ch/Report.html. There were also notable attacks
on the technological infrastructure of Estonia in May 2007, which were allegedly attributable
to Russia. See Ian Traynor, Russia Accused of Unleashing Cyberwar to Disable Estonia, THE
GUARDIAN (U.K), May 17, 2007, at 1.
Ill.
See Tom J. Farer. Politicaland Economic Coercion in Contemporary International
Law, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 405, 408-10 (1985).
112.
See, e.g., Scott J. Shackelford, Note, From Nuclear War to Net War: Analogizing
Cyber Attacks in International Law, 27 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 192, 237 (2009). Although

Shackelford does go on to say that if the cyber-attack in question could be viewed as being
comparable to a physical military attack in terms of causing damage to life and property (presumably, for example, by launching a state's own missiles against it), this would constitute
armed force in breach of Article 2(4) and would thus potentially trigger Article 51. Id. at 23739.

MichiganJournal of InternationalLaw

240

[Vol. 32:215

cyber-attacks (do, or should) fall within the prohibition in Article 2(4).
These authors argue that such attacks are-given modem reliance on
technology for national defense systems-potentially as damaging to a
state's national security as a military attack and thus should be included."'
Notably, those writers who take the latter view have already begun to
assert the peremptory status of the "prohibition of cyber-attacks" as a
component of a larger peremptory norm prohibiting the use of force." 4
Again, it can be seen that there is not yet a consensus among states that
the notion of cyber-attacks is prohibited at all by the jus ad bellum, let
alone the kind of agreement necessary to confer peremptory status. Indeed, there is still relatively little state practice relating to the issue at
all."' As such, the traditional position-that "force" means "armed
force"-must still be a correct expression of the jus cogens norm here
(if, of course, one accepts the peremptory character of the prohibition at
all).
It may well be that a new interpretation of the meaning of "force"
will evolve in the future to take into account the growing threat of cyberwarfare. Such a change would not require any alteration of Article 2(4),
of course, just a reinterpretation of its terminology in customary international law, based on state practice and opinio juris in the usual way.
However, a change to the meaning of "force" would require a nearuniversal state acceptance of the altered content of thejus cogens norm.
Irrespective of the merits of the particular rules taken as examples
here, one can make a strong argument that the rules of the jus ad bellum
should be free to develop to deal with our changing world, given that this
area of the law relates to the national security of states and, crucially, to
the security of the people who live in them."6 However, once the arduous
See, e.g., Todd A. Morth, Note, Considering Our Position: Viewing Information
113.
Warfare as a Use of Force Prohibitedby Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter,30 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L

114.
115.

L. 567 (1998).
See, e.g., Schmitt, supra note 4, at 922.
Id. at 921.

116.
Lepard has, for example, contended that it may be important from an ethical point
of view that the law on the use of force is able to develop, and seems to suggest that the restriction on the alteration of the jus ad bellum that would stem from peremptory status is
therefore undesirable. LEPARD, supra note 82, at 260. Indeed, Lepard takes the view that the
problem of the potential stagnation of jus cogens norms more generally means that "it does
not seem necessary to recognize" the requirement in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties that ajus cogens norm can only be altered by "a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character." Id. at 259-60. Yet-however much this may
solve the problem of the restricted development of the jus ad bellum-there is no legal justification for ignoring the requirement that jus cogens norms can only be altered by other jus
cogens norms; this would amount to an unwarranted unilateral alteration of the way in which
peremptory rules are created. For more general discussion on the need for the continued development of the jus ad bellum, see CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF
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tests for the establishment of a jus cogens norm are considered to have
been met for a composite selection of key jus ad bellum rules, then
whatever norm is framed would become static. The only way to alter it
would be to go through the process of establishing the criteria for peremptory status again. This is a notably difficult process, particularly
when it is considered that any changes or new rules are likely to be
struck down in the developmental stage as being contrary to the existing
*

jus cogens norm.

117

Again, the aim here is not to make value judgments as to how flexible the law on the use of force should be; a counter argument to the need
for development and adaptability in the jus ad bellum can, of course, be
credibly framed, such as in terms of the need for objectivity, certainty,
and consistency in the context of the legal regulation of military action."'
Leaving such arguments aside, the crucial point here is that the static
nature of the modem jus ad bellum-something that would logically
flow from an application of the jus cogens conceptual framework to the
law on the use of force-simply does not reflect the reality of the development of this area of the law in current practice.
IV. THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE PROHIBITION AS A
PEREMPTORY NORM BY STATES

Even if one takes the view that it is possible to frame a suitable norm
that could take account of the exceptions to the prohibition of the use of
force and the complexity and uncertainty of the jus ad bellum, an additional hurdle must be cleared before the peremptory status of any such
norm can be established. This is the question of whether the rule has, in
fact, been accepted as jus cogens by states at all.

FORCE 4 (3d ed. 2008) (pointing out that many scholars "argue that international law [on the
use of force] is evolving to meet new threats, and welcome the changes they identify in the
law").
DINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 102-04; Scholtz, supra note 4, at 10-11 (making this
117.
point with regard to the possible customary development of humanitarian intervention as an
additional exception to the prohibition of the use of force); Glennon, supra note 8, at 1269
(pushing this argument somewhat further by taking the view that the doctrine of jus cogens
illogically requires that any potential changes to existing jus cogens norms will necessarily
always be struck down by the current version of the peremptory norm).
118.
See, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 29, at 398-401 (applying such arguments to the
specific claim that an objective definition of "war" would be desirable). See generally, Henkin, supra note 1, at 58-60 (discussing actions and justifications posed by the United States
that express a relaxation of normative prohibitions).
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A. The General Lack of Reference to State
Practicein the Literature

The majority of writers who have concluded that the prohibition of
the use of force possesses the character of a jus cogens norm have not
supported such assertions with reference to state practice." 9 Instead,
when this claim has been evidenced at all, it is usually through citation
of the avowed acceptance of this position by the ICJ in the Nicaragua
case.12 As was discussed earlier, it is not entirely clear whether the ICJ
did, in fact, accept that the prohibition was jus cogens (although it is the
present author's reading of the decision that the Court did take this view,
albeit somewhat ambiguously).12 ' Assuming that the ICJ has affirmed the
peremptory status of the prohibition, such endorsement from the "principal judicial organ of the United Nations" 22 would lend a good deal of
weight to the conclusion that the norm is a peremptory one.12
However-irrespective of whether one takes the view that the Court
did or did not hold that the prohibition was jus cogens-it is clear that
the ICJ in the Nicaraguacase presented little evidence that would support the peremptory character of the prohibition of the use of force. The
Court's only explicit reference to "state practice" was to point to the fact
that the United States and Nicaragua had both adopted it in their pleadings.'24 The only other source the Court referred to was to quote directly
the position taken by the ILC in 1966.2' When this trail is followed to
the ILC commentary on the draft articles that formed the basis for the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, it becomes apparent that the
119.
See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 99-104; MOIR, supra note 4, at 9; WHEELER,
supra note 4, at 45; Charney, supra note 4, at 837; Kritsiotis, supra note 4, at 1042-43; Parker
& Neylon, supra note 4, 436-37; Schmitt, supra note 4, at 922; Scholtz, supra note 4, at 8;
Simma, supra note 4, at 3; Stephens, supra note 4, at 253-54; Verdross, supra note 4, at 60;

Whiteman, supra note 4, at 625.
See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 99-104;
120.

WHEELER, supra note 4, at 45; Kritsiotis, supra note 4, at 1042-43; Parker & Neylon, supra note 4, 436-37; Schmitt, supra note

4, at 922.
See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
121.
As the Court is labeled in the U.N. Charter and the Statute of the International
122.
Court of Justice. U.N. Charter art. 92; ICJ Statute, supra note 18, art. 1.
It has already been noted that the Court's decisions are extremely influential and are
123.
often seen as authoritative statements of international law. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
124.
Judgment on the Merits, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 190 (June 27). In addition, the ICJ noted that prohibition of the use of force was "frequently referred to in statements by State representatives as
being not only a principle of customary international law but also a fundamental or cardinal
principleof such law." Id. (emphasis added). This could arguably be seen as another reference
by the Court to acceptance of the peremptory status of the prohibition in state practice, though
this cannot be said with certainty.
125.
Id.
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conclusion that the prohibition is a jus cogens norm was made by the
Commission without offering any supporting evidence at all.126 Moreover, in 2001, when the IEC again reaffirmed the peremptory status of
the prohibition in the context of state responsibility, it merely supported
its claim through references to its own stated position in 1966 and to the
ICJ's apparent finding to that effect in the Nicaragua case.127
This process of circular justification led D' Amato to conclude that
the "only requirement" necessary for the ICJ to seemingly reach the
conclusion that the use of force was a jus cogens norm in the Nicaragua
case "was the garnering of a majority vote of the judges present at The
Hague."'28 Without further investigation, it is, of course, impossible to
tell whether D'Amato is correct here. Simply because the Court did not
adequately support the view that the prohibition was peremptory does
not mean that such a view is necessarily incorrect; a failure to produce
sufficient evidence does not in itself confirm that there is none, although
it is perhaps indicative of such a conclusion.
B. The Nature of the State PracticeRequiredfor a

Norm to Gain Peremptory Status
The question, then, is whether such evidence exists. As a matter of
law, it is of little consequence whether the ICJ, the ILC, or a plethora of
other writers have concluded that the prohibition of the use of force is a
jus cogens norm. Such evidence can only be found in the practice of
states.
Returning to the criteria for the existence of a peremptory norm as
derived from Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, what matters is whether the norm is "accepted and recognized by
the international community of States as a whole." 29 Indeed, the question
is not merely whether the norm is accepted and recognized as being a
legal norm by the whole community. The prohibition of the use of force
would certainly meet such a test; it is universally accepted and universal
in terms of its applicability to states."3
A close reading of Article 53 reveals that this is not enough. The issue is whether the norm is accepted and recognized by the community as
a whole as a peremptory norm."' Under the positivist conception of jus

126.
See Int'l Law Comm'n, supra note 34, at 247-48.
Int'l Law Comm'n, supra note 35, at 283.
127.
D'Amato, supra note 8, at 3. See also Christenson,supra note 81.
128.
129.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 13, art. 53.
See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
130.
This can be seen from the fact that the Article requires that the "norm [is] accepted
131.
and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no
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cogens, there is a two-stage process of opinio juris at work.'32 The first
stage is the usual test of whether states accept the rule as being a binding
one. Stage two is whether they accept that binding rule as being of a
norm of jus cogens.'" Thus, Hannikainen correctly holds that the prohibition of the use of force is universally accepted as a rule of international
law, but then incorrectly assumes that this is enough to conclude that it
has been accepted as a peremptory rule.M
Admittedly, it would seem apparent that acceptance and recognition
by the "international community of States as a whole" does not necessitate universal acceptance and recognition by states as to the peremptory
character of any given norm. As the chairman of the Drafting Committee
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties made clear, it is enough
for "a very large majority" of states to take such a position.' This may
be somewhat conceptually dubious in a positivist system built on state
consent, given that peremptory norms bind all and are non-derogable.16
However, this is, for many, justified by the need to avoid a single state
vetoing a peremptory norm accepted as such by all others.' In any
event, for a jus cogens norm to form, there must be near universal acceptance that the norm is a peremptory one. It is questionable whether such
a large majority has been achieved with regard to the prohibition of the
use of force.

derogation is permitted." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 13, art. 53
(emphasis added).
132.
It is worth noting here that the present writer takes the view that a rule that forms
the basis of a norm of jus cogens can derive from any source of law-for example, treaty law
or customary international law-but that the process that turns the rule from an "ordinary"
norm to a peremptory one is a process of customary international law formation, or at least
something broadly akin to that process. In other words, a treaty-based rule may itself be the
source of a norm of jus cogens, but it is the near-universal agreement by states that the rule is
peremptory (acceptance that resembles the concept of opinio juris) that makes it so. Further
consideration of this issue goes beyond the scope of this Article, but for a more detailed discussion of the "sources" ofjus cogens norms, see Byers, supra note 38, at 220-29.
133.
Linderfalk, supra note 10, at 862.
134.
HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 323-33.
135.
United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Mar. 26-May 24, 1968, 80th
Meeting of the Committee of the Whole,

1

12, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/C.1/SR.80 (May 21,

1968).
136.
See HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 49; Gennadit M. Danilenko, InternationalJus
Cogens: Issues of Law-Making, 2 EUR. J. INT'L L. 42, 48-57 (1991); Glennon, supra note 8,
at 1266, 1268.
137.
Rafael Nieto-Navia, International Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) and International HumanitarianLaw, in MAN'S INHUMANITY TO MAN: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
IN HONOUR OF ANTONIO CASSESE

595, 612 (Lal C. Vohrah et al. eds., 2003).
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C. A Brief Survey of State Acceptance of the Prohibition
as Peremptory in Practice
The constraints of an article of this kind mean that, unfortunately, it

is impossible to examine the positions taken by states as to the jus cogens nature of the prohibition of the use of force in any detail.
Nonetheless, a few examples can be highlighted to demonstrate that a
contention that states "as a whole" have accepted and recognized such a
position-even reading that term to mean a "large majority"-is perhaps
not self-evident and certainly requires further investigation. It may, at
least, be said that in notable instances where states have had the opportunity to explicitly affirm the peremptory status of the prohibition, and
might reasonably have been expected to do so, there has been a trend
toward silence on the issue.
For example, Kahgan points to the fact that "[o]f the thirty-two
states submitting examples of jus cogens [at the Conference on the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties], half declared that the
prohibition on the use of force was clearly of such character."'38 For
Kahgan, the fact that half of the states that contributed to the debate on
Article 53 (nde 50) took this view confirms the status of the prohibition
as jus cogens. Conversely, one might argue that the fact that the other
half did not take this view is more telling. Half is self-evidently not a
majority, let alone a significant enough majority to be considered the
"whole" of the international community of states. When one examines
the travaux prdparatoiresof the Convention, it is evident that fourteen
states explicitly claimed that the prohibition was, or might have been, a
jus cogens norm." 9 Kahgan's claim is therefore essentially accurate, in
that this is roughly half of the total number of states that put forward
suggested peremptory norms at the conference (thirty-two).140 A perhaps

138.
Kahgan, supra note 4, at 779.
139.
See United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Vienna, Austria, Ist Sess.,
Mar. 26-May 24, 1968, Summary Records of Meetings of the Committee of the Whole, at 154,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/11 (1969) (Bolivia); id. at 273, 320 (Ecuador); id. at 275-76 (The
Netherlands); id. at 282 (Hungary); id. at 295 (Greece); id. at 296 (Kenya); id. at 303 (Uruguay); id. at 306 (Cyprus); id. at 318 (Federal Republic of Germany); id. at 321 (Tanzania); id.
at 322 (Ukraine); id. at 323 (Philippines); id. at 324 (Norway); id. at 326 (Malaysia).
States suggested possible examples of jus cogens norms throughout the debates at
140.
the U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, particularly in the context of the discussion of
Article 50 (which later became Article 53) of the treaty. See id. at 154 (Bolivia); id. at 258-59
(Holy See); id. at 265 (Ethiopia); id. at 271 (Peru); id. at 273, 320 (Ecuador); id. at 275-76
(The Netherlands); id. at 282 (Hungary); id. at 294 (the Soviet Union); id. at 295 (Greece); id.
at 295 (Iraq); id. at 296 (Kenya); id. at 297 (Cuba); id. at 297 (Lebanon); id. at 298 (Nigeria);
id. at 299 (Chile); id. at 300 (Sierra Leone); id. at 301 (Ghana); id. at 302 (Colombia); id. at
303 (Uruguay); id. at 306 (Cyprus); id. at 307 (the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic); id.
at 312 (Romania); id. at 313 (Bulgaria); id. at 318 (Czechoslovakia); id. at 318 (Federal
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more notable statistic, however, is that these states represented just under
fourteen percent of the total number of states with delegations at the conference (103).1'
A similar pattern may be seen in other comparable debates. One important example is the discussions in 1970 with regard to the drafting of
the Declaration on the Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States.14 2 In these debates, a
small number of states certainly took the view that the prohibition was a
jus cogens norm. Venezuela thus stated that the rules on non-use of force
and the peaceful settlement of disputes were "authentic examples of jus
cogens."l43 Iraq'" and Ethiopia 45 were also explicit in taking this position.
In contrast, the United States took the opposite view, holding that although these rules were highly desirable and would contribute to "a
better and more tolerant world," this did not mean they were jus cogens.14 Hungary also explicitly argued against the peremptory status of
the rule.147 Similarly, though less explicitly, The Netherlands suggested
that the rules contained in the declaration (which include the prohibition
of the use of force) had not been accepted as jus cogens norms, or, at
least, that the draft declaration itself was not representative of peremptory norms.148 The views of these states here are particularly notable, as
they represent an extremely rare, and perhaps unique, example of states
Republic of Germany); id. at 319 (Ceylon); id. at 321 (Tanzania); id. at 322 (Ukraine); id. at
323 (Philippines); id. at 323 (Canada); id. at 324 (Norway); id. at 326 (Malaysia).
141.
See id. at xiii-xxii (showing a full list of state delegations).
142.
See Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A.
Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8082, at 121-24 (Oct.
24, 1970).
143.
Special Comm. on Principles of Int'l Law Concerning Friendly Rel. and CoOperation Among States, Rep., at 77, U.N. Doc. A/8018; GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 18
(1970) [hereinafter Rep. of the Special Comm.]. See also id. at 63 (containing the draft declaration).
144.
See U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., 1180th mtg. at 17, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.1180 (Sept.
24, 1970); Rep. of the Special Comm., supra note 143, at 63.
145.
See U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., 1182nd mtg. at 31, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.1182 and
Corr.1 (Sept. 25, 1970); Rep. of the Special Comm., supra note 143, at 63.
146.
Rep. of Special Comm., supra note 143, at 119. However, it is important to note
that the United States has elsewhere, and more recently, taken the opposite view-that the
prohibition is peremptory. See infra notes 185-195 and accompanying text.
See U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., 1179th mtg. at 14, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.1179 (Sept.
147.
24, 1970); Rep. of the Special Comm., supra note 143, at 63. It should be noted that this
would seem to be a reversal of the Hungarian position as expressed at the first session of the
Conference on the Law of Treaties in 1968. See U.N. Doc. A/Conf.39/ll , supra note 139, at
282.
148.
See U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., 1183rd mtg. at 38, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.1183 (Sept.
28, 1970).
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explicitly rejecting the peremptory status of the prohibition, rather than
merely choosing not to affirm it.
Another example of this kind can be seen in the debates over a proposal for a treaty on the use of force to supplement the U.N. Charter,
which was initially put forward by the Soviet Union in 1976.149 Hannikainen uses the discussions on this proposal in the Special Committee on
Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Non-Use of Force in International Relations to support his claim that the prohibition is
peremptory."o However, as only summaries of these debates were ever
published, it is difficult to know the number of states that explicitly held
this view."' Admittedly, the summaries at times indicate that some states
referred to the prohibition as jus cogens,152 but exactly how many states
held that the prohibition itself was peremptory is unclear.
The summaries do indicate that Egypt,"' Mongolia,'" Poland,'
Czechoslovakia,"' and Cyprus explicitly held the position that the prohibition was peremptory. Cuba also apparently stated that the prohibition
was peremptory, but then tellingly went on to say that it was a rule that
was poorly defined and not satisfactorily codified."' It is not clear from
the summaries whether other states also held that the rule was peremptory. Nonetheless, it is evident that a few states did expressly take the
position that the prohibition was jus cogens.

Having said this, it equally may be said that in these extensive discussions ranging over seven years and relating directly to the law on the
use of force in a committee set up specifically to examine the prohibition, the summaries only confirm that a handful of states expressly
affirmed its peremptory character. It is also worth noting that Hungary
supported the proposed treaty on the basis that this "constituted a sound
See Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Letter dated Sept. 28, 1976 from the
149.
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/31/243 (Sept. 28, 1976) (setting out the draft of the proposed
treaty).
HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 324-25.
150.
See generally Special Comm. on Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of
151.
Non-Use of Force in Int'l Rel. [Special Comm. on Non-Use of Force], Reps., U.N. Docs.
A/33/41-A/39/41; GAOR, 33d-39th Sess., Supp. No. 41 (1978-1984).
See, e.g., Special Comm. on Non-Use of Force, Rep., at 10, U.N. Doc. A/34/41;
152.
GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 41 (1979); Special Comm. on Non-Use of Force, Rep., 1 174,
U.N. Doc. A/35/41: GAOR, 35th Sess., Supp. No. 41 (1980).
Special Comm. on Non-Use of Force, Rep., at 12, U.N. Doc. A/36/41; GAOR, 36th
153.
Sess., Supp. No. 41 (1981).
Id. at 13.
154.
Id. at 31.
155.
Special Comm. on Non-Use of Force, Rep., at 12, U.N. Doc. A/37/41; GAOR, 37th
156.
Sess., Supp. No. 41 (1982).
Id. at 60.
157.
Id. at 55.
158.
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basis for working out ... universally binding, jus cogens rules."'

The

implication here is that Hungary did not view the prohibition, at least as
it stood at the time, as being peremptory." Spain additionally argued
that a claim as to the peremptory character of the rule might be meaningless in the light of states' violations of the prohibition in practice."' One
may also point to the fact that, of the seventeen principles devised by the
Committee's working group in 1980 to clarify the prohibition of the use
of force and its content, only one stated that the rule was peremptory.162
Ultimately, the Special Committee was only made up of thirty-five
states.163 Thus, even if one accepts Hannikainen's conclusion that the
summaries indicate an acceptance by the Committee of the peremptory
status of the prohibition, it can be very credibly argued that the view of
the Committee is not necessarily representative of the community of
states as a whole. It might, of course, be indicative of such wider acceptance, but it would be hard to argue that it establishes this conclusively.
Moreover, in the parallel debates on the same agenda item in the
Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, which is comprised of all
U.N. member states and for which full plenary records are available, it is
interesting that only five states explicitly held that the prohibition was
peremptory.'64 It is also worth noting that, during the Sixth Committee
debates, Mexico explicitly held that the principle of non-intervention
was not a jus cogens norm.'6 1 Of course, this is not the same as a denial
of the peremptory status of the prohibition of the use of force, but the
prohibition is generally seen as an element of that principle, or certainly
linked to it.'66
159.
Special Comm. on Non-Use of Force, Rep., at 10, U.N. Doc. A/35/41; GAOR, 35th
Sess., Supp. No. 41 (1980) (emphasis added).
Again, this would seem to be a reversal of the Hungarian position as expressed at
160.
the first session of the Conference on the Law of Treaties in 1968. See U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.39/ll, supra note 139, at 282.
Special Comm. on Non-Use of Force, supra note 153, at 10.
161.
162.
This was "Principle 7." See Special Comm. on Non-Use of Force, supra note 159,
at 47-50.
See G.A. Res. 32/150, at 214, U.N. Doc. AIRES/32/150 (Dec. 19, 1977) (setting up
163.
the Special Committee).
These were: Greece, Special Comm. on Non-Use of Force, Rep., Oct. 15, 1979, at
164.
2, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/34/SR.17 (Oct. 18, 1979); Pakistan, Special Comm. on Non-Use of Force,
Rep., Oct. 19, 1979, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/34/SR.22 (Oct. 29, 1979); Chile, id. at 12; Togo,
Special Comm. on Non-Use of Force, Rep., Oct. 22, 1979, at 10, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/34/SR.23
(Oct. 26, 1979); Zaire, Special Comm. on Non-Use of Force, Rep, Oct 29, 1980, 38, U.N.
Doc. A/C.6/35/SR.32 (Nov. 10, 1980). In addition to these five states, Singapore implied that
it also took this position, but it was not at all conclusive on this. See id. 43.
Special Comm. on Non-Use of Force, Rep., Oct. 24, 1980, 50, U.N. Doc.
165.
A/C.6/35/SR.29 (Oct. 31, 1980).
166.
See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
Judgment on the Merits, 1986 I.C.J. 14, U 205, 247 (June 27) ("The element of coercion,
which defines, and indeed forms the very essence of, prohibited intervention, is particularly
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Another useful example is the debates in the Sixth Committee of the
General Assembly in 1987 regarding the framing of the Declaration on
the Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the Principle of Refraining from
the Threat or Use of Force in International Relations.'6 ' Here, Greece was
very clear that it saw the prohibition as a peremptory norm.' Indeed, it
was concerned that the draft declaration did not make this explicit.169
However, in extensive debates that directly concerned the status of the
prohibition of the use of force, Greece was the only state to take this
view.o Admittedly, unlike in the debates on the Friendly Relations Declaration, states here did not explicitly reject the peremptory status of the
prohibition; but it still may be seen as significant that only one state was
willing to affirm it, given that the entire debate again concerned the
status of the rule and its further codification. Moreover, despite Greece's
concerns, the Declaration on Threat or Use of Force that was finally
adopted by the General Assembly ultimately made no mention of the
peremptory character of the rule that it was clarifying."' Even Hannikainen, who strongly supports the peremptory status of the prohibition,
has commented
that it was notable that the Declaration was silent on the
72

issue. 1

Like Kahgan and Hannikainen, Orakhelashvili also takes the rare
step of referring to state practice in support of the claim that a use of
force is contrary to jus cogens. For example, he points to the fact that
Cyprus argued before the Security Council in 1964 that the Treaty of
Guarantee between Cyprus, Greece, the United Kingdom, and Turkey"'
was contrary to jus cogens and thus void. 4 This was on the basis that
obvious in the case of an intervention which uses force, either in the direct form of military
action, or in the indirect form of support for subversive or terrorist armed activities within
another State." The Court therefore saw a breach of the principle of non-intervention as inherent in an unlawful use of force, which indicates that an unlawful use of force is necessarily an
unlawful intervention, and that the prohibition of the use of force is therefore something that
falls within a wider prohibition of intervention). See also GREEN, supra note 88, at 31-33.
167.
Declaration on the Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the Principle of Refraining
from the Threat or Use of Force in International Relations, G.A. Res. 42/22, U.N. GAOR, 42d
Sess. Supp. No. 22, at 287-89, U.N. Doc. AIRES/42/22 (Nov. 18, 1987).
168.
Special Comm. on Non-Use of Force, Rep., Oct. 13, 1987, at 19-20, U.N. Doc.
A/C.6/42/SR.21 (Oct. 23, 1987).
169.
Special Comm. on Non-Use of Force, Rep., Oct. 13, 1987, at 7, U.N. Doc.
A/C.6/42/SR.20 (Oct. 16, 1987).
170.
See generally Special Comm. on Non-Use of Force, Reps., Oct. 8-13, 1987, U.N.
Docs. A/C.6/42/SR.17-A/C.6/42/SR.22; GAOR, 42d Sess. (1987).
171.
See Declaration on the Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the Principle of Refraining from the Threat or Use of Force in International Relations, supra note 167.
172.
HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 325.
173.
Treaty of Guarantee, Cyprus-Greece-U.K.-Turk., Aug. 16, 1960, 382 U.N.T.S. 4.
174.
ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 4, at 157-61. For this claim by Cyprus, see U.N.
SCOR, 19th Sess. 1098th mtg. at 16-17, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1098 (Feb. 27, 1964).
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Article IV of that Treaty arguably gave Turkey the right to militarily intervene in Cyprus.' However, as Orakhelashvili notes,' the discussion
in the Security Council concerned the question of whether the Treaty
violated the rules of the jus ad bellum, and not whether the prohibition of
the use of force should be considered jus cogens.7 1
Thus, no state other than Cyprus took the view that the prohibition
was peremptory, and the Security Council as a whole expressed no opinion on this aspect of Cyprus' argument. ' It would seem odd that those
states that supported Cyprus' general position that Article IV of the
Treaty of Guarantee was unlawful (on the basis that it allowed for the
use of force)179 did not employ this "jus cogens argument." This would
appear to have been an obvious position to take, given that this would
indicate that the Treaty was void ab initio. Instead, these states opted
simply to argue that the Treaty violated Article 2(4) in a more general
sense.
Moreover, it is notable that some states expressed a degree of approval for the Treaty.'"' The reasoning employed by these states was not
entirely clear, although it must be admitted that this seemed to be on the
basis that Article IV did not violate the prohibition at all, rather than because the prohibition was not peremptory. 8 2 It is certainly true that no
state explicitly claimed that the rule was not a jus cogens norm. Nonetheless, these debates in the Security Council again offered states a clear
and obvious opportunity to affirm the peremptory status of the prohibition. Indeed, this issue was explicitly raised in the Security Council by
one state and then studiously ignored by all others.
Taking Security Council debates more generally-which by their
very nature relate to issues of the use of force-it is extremely rare for
states to affirm the peremptory status of the prohibition. One example is
175.
176.
177.

U.N. SCOR, supra note 174, at 16-17.
See ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 4, at 158-59.
See generally, U.N. SCOR, 19th Sess. 1094th mtg.-ll04th mtg., U.N. Does.

S/PV.1094-S/PV. 1104 (Feb. 17-Mar. 17, 1964).
See S.C. Res. 186, U.N. SCOR, 19th Sess. U.N. Doc. S/5575 (Mar. 4, 1964); S.C.
178.
Res. 187, U.N. SCOR, 19th Sess. U.N. Doc. S/5603 (Mar. 13, 1964). Both emerged from the
debates in the Security Council over the Cyprus issue at this time, but neither touched on the
jus cogens question.

There were a number of states that took this view. See, for example, the positions
179.
adopted by the Soviet Union, U.N. SCOR, 19th Sess. 1096th mtg. at 3-12, U.N. Doc.
S/PV.1096 (Feb. 19, 1964), and Czechoslovakia, U.N. SCOR, 19th Sess., 1097th mtg. at 1015, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1097 (Feb. 25, 1964).
180.
181.

See sources cited supra note 179.
See, for example, the positions of the United States, U.N. SCOR, 19th Sess. 1096th

mtg., supra note 179, at 13-17, and the United Kingdom, U.N. SCOR, 1098th mtg., supra
note 174, at 10-14.
See, U.N. SCOR, 19th Sess., 1096th mtg., supra note 179, at 13-17; U.N. SCOR,
182.
21st Sess., 1098th mtg., supra note 174, at 10-14.
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a statement to this effect by Japan with regard to the Falklands/Malvinas
conflict in 1982. Here, the Japanese representative in the Security Council accused Argentina of violating a jus cogens norm by using force in
attempting to reclaim the islands.1' Another more recent example is India's reference in 1999 to the peremptory status of the prohibition in the
context of discussions in the Security Council on the issue of children in
armed conflict.8M However, these two examples are notable because they
appear anomalous when compared to common practice. They are exceptions to a general trend and are relevant because of their scarcity.
Finally, of the few scholars that do cite state practice in support of
the peremptory status of the prohibition, a number make much of the fact
that the United States has taken this view.' This is sometimes evidenced
by pointing to the expression of the view that the prohibition is jus cogens in the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States
(Third). 86 Care should be taken here, however, as the "restatements of
the law" treatises are prepared by an independent body, the American
Law Institute, and thus, this document cannot be seen as constituting the
practice of the United States.
Nonetheless, it is generally true that the United States has viewed the
prohibition as a jus cogens norm. 87 As noted above, the United States,
along with Nicaragua, saw the rule as peremptory during the Nicaragua
case proceedings.' Indeed, the United States has explicitly taken this
view elsewhere.' This is potentially very important, as the legal position of the United States is perhaps more telling at this point in history
in the context of the formation of customary international law than the
183.
U.N. SCOR, 37th Sess. 2350th mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2350 (Apr. 3, 1982).
184.
U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4037th mtg. at 22, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4037 (Resumption 1)
(Aug. 25, 1999).
185.
See, e.g., Ronzitti, supra note 4, at 150; Schachter, supra note 4, at 129.
186.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102
cmt. k (1987). See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 1, at 9-10, 10 n. 63; Stephens, supra note 4, at
254.
187.
Having said this, the United States has not always taken this viewpoint, as is evidenced by its expressed position in 1970, in the context of the debates over the drafting of the
Declaration on the Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
188.
See supra note 39 and accompanying text. Again, it should be noted that Nicaragua's position as to the peremptory status of the prohibition in its Memorial was not entirely
explicit, although this could be inferred from para. 231 of the Nicaraguan Memorial. Iran took
this view more explicitly in its written pleadings in the Oil Platforms case, Memorial of the
Islamic Republic of Iran, Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. Pleadings
Vol. 14, 4.05-4.06 (June 8, 1993).
189.
See, e.g., Memorandum from R.B. Owen, Legal Adviser of the State Dep't to Warren Christopher, Acting Sec'y of State (Dec. 29, 1979), quoted in Marian N. Leich,
Contemporary Practiceof the United States Relating to InternationalLaw, 74 Am. J.

418,418-20(1980).
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positions taken by other states, particularly with regard to the jus ad
bellum.'90

However, the test for a jus cogens norm is more exacting than that
for the formation of "ordinary" customary international law.' 9' It would
seem reasonable to conclude that, with regard to the conferring of peremptory status, the view advanced by the United States is far from
weighty enough to "tip the balance" toward a conclusion that the community as a whole has taken any such position, unless there already
exists a large majority of states holding the same view. For example,
Orakhelashvili has highlighted that the United States argued that a 1978
treaty between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan 92 might be void for
conflicting with jus cogens, on the basis that Article 4 of the Treaty potentially provided for the use of force.' 93 This was indeed the position
that the United States took,194 but it is perhaps more notable that no other
state appeared to take this view regarding the Treaty, or seemed willing
to support such a position.'95
D. The Implications of the Sporadic State Acceptance
of the Prohibitionas Peremptory

This brief foray into the state practice is not even close to being
sufficient to conclusively demonstrate that the prohibition of the use of
force has failed to achieve peremptory status by virtue of a lack of state
acceptance. Indeed, there are some clear examples of states explicitly
adhering to this view. While the majority of states refrained from affirming the peremptory status of the prohibition in the debates
highlighted, in most cases, at least some states did expressly hold this
view. As such, one may point to a cumulative effect of acceptance
across these examples. 1
The position of the United States is in particular important in the context of the
190.
customary development of the jus ad bellum, because it is one of the few states that is capable
of using military force on any significant scale. See James A. Green, Fluctuating Evidentiary
Standardsfor Self-Defence in the International Court of Justice, 58 INT. & COMP. L.Q. 163,
174-75 (2009); Mary E. O'Connell, Evidence of Terror, 7 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 19, 25

(2002).
191.
See supra note 108, and accompanying text. See also supra note 132 (explaining
the similarities between the process of the formation of jus cogens norms and customary international law).
Afghanistan and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Treaty of Friendship, Good192.
Neighborliness and Cooperation, Afg.-U.S.S.R., Dec. 5, 1978, 1145 U.N.T.S. 17976.
193.
ORAKHELASHV1L1, supra note 4, at 161-62.
194.
Owen, supra note 189, 4.
Moreover, a reading of the Treaty would suggest that it was not a breach of the
195.
prohibition of the use of force in any event. See Afg.-U.S.S.R. Treaty, supra note 192.
Part IV.C of this Article considers a number of examples of state practice in this
196.
context: the debates of 1968 at the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, see
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Moreover, it would also seem that states almost never explicitly deny
the peremptory status of the prohibition (leaving aside the apparently
anomalous occurrence of this during the debates over the Friendly Relations Declaration). Nonetheless, it would seem much more common for
states to refrain from taking any position as to the peremptory status of
the prohibition, than to affirm its jus cogens character. This is true even
when presented with claims to this effect made by other states or when
there was a clear and suitable opportunity to do so. This, it is argued,
would appear to be the overall position even when the practice cited here
is taken cumulatively.
Of course, these examples of equivocal silence may be explained
away on the basis that states have tended to see the peremptory status of
the prohibition as self-evident. Alternatively, in some instances, a failure
to affirm the peremptory status of the prohibition may have been because
it was politically imprudent in the particular circumstances to do so. One
could easily envisage this possibility with regard to the Cyprus/Turkey
dispute over the Treaty of Guarantee, for example.9 7 It must be admitted
that silence is not the same thing as explicit rejection, but then neither is
it the same as affirmation. The silence of the majority is usually seen as
being enough for the constitution of new rules of customary international
law. Indeed, silence is interpreted as acquiescence for the purposes of
"ordinary" customary law making.9 8 However, it may be questioned
supra notes 138-141 and accompanying text, the debates in various forums concerning the
1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, see supra
notes 142-148 and accompanying text, the debates between 1976 and 1983, in various forums,
regarding the Soviet proposal for a supplementary treaty on the use of force, see supra notes
149-166 and accompanying text, the 1987 debates in Sixth Committee of the U.N. General
Assembly regarding the framing of the Declaration on the Enhancement of the Effectiveness
of the Principle of Refraining from the Threat or Use of Force in International Relations, see
supra notes 167-172 and accompanying text, the debates in the U.N. Security Council, both
generally and specifically with regard to the 1964 dispute over the 1960 Cyprus/Turkey Treaty
of Guarantee, see supra notes 173-184 and accompanying text, and the practice of the United
States, in general but particularly with regard to the 1978 treaty between the Soviet Union and
Afghanistan, see supra notes 185-195 and accompanying text.
197.
See supra notes 173-182 and accompanying text.
198.
This can be seen from the common view that states can only exempt themselves
from emerging customary international law through persistent objection. See, e.g., Michael
Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 23-27
(1974-1975); Maurice H. Mendelson, The Formation of Customary Law, 272 RECUEIL DE
COURs 155, 227-44 (1998); Ted Stein, The Approach of the Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent Objector in InternationalLaw, 26 HARV. INT'L L. J. 457 (1985). It

should be noted that the present writer does not necessarily subscribe to the existence of the
so-called "persistent objector rule" in international law and instead takes the skeptical view
advanced by, for example, Jonathan I. Charney, The PersistentObjector Rule and the Development of Customary InternationalLaw 56 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1985). However, such a
critique is beyond the scope of this Article.
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whether silence is enough to bestow supernorm status on a rule, given
that agreement must be reached by the community of states as a whole,
and given that once the rule is formed, states are essentially stuck with
it. 9

Taking a contrary view, one could argue that the fact that states do
not explicitly reject the peremptory status of the prohibition can be explained on the basis that it would be politically unwise for them to do so.
Given the value-based rhetoric surrounding jus cogens, and the agreed
importance of the prohibition in modem international law, any suggestion by a state that the rule is not jus cogens could well be perceived as
some kind of nefarious endorsement of international aggression. Yet, if
the community of states as a whole has truly accepted the rule as peremptory, one might expect such acceptance to be explicit in a more
widespread manner than this brief survey indicates.
Christenson has made the point, with regard to the claims put forward by scholars that any particular rule of international law is a
peremptory norm, that the "[s]tate practice cited in support of overriding
norms of jus cogens seems suspect and fragmented." 2m Two points can be
made here. First, writers claiming the peremptory status of the prohibition of the use of force do not tend to cite any state practice, "suspect" or
otherwise, to support this. Second, when one does begin to examine the
practice, it would seem that there is enough evidence to at least suggest
that state acceptance and recognition of the peremptory status of the
prohibition of the use of force may be "fragmented."
Some states are, or have been, explicit that they see the prohibition
of the use of force as being peremptory. There may perhaps be enough
practice of this kind to support such a view, depending on how strictly
the requirement of acceptance and recognition by the community of
states as a whole is applied. Equally, a larger number of states seem un199.

Most scholars would hold that the "persistent objector rule" cannot apply to jus

cogens norms. See, e.g., LEPARD, supra note 82, at 235-37, 250-52; Byers, supra note 38, at
217, 223; Jonathan I. Chamey, Universal InternationalLaw, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 529, 541
(1993); Holning Lau, Rethinking the Persistent Objector Doctrine in International Human
Rights Law, 6 CHIc. J. INT'L L. 495, 495, 498 (2005); J. Brock McClane, How Late in the
Emergence of a Norm of Customary InternationalLaw May a PersistentObjector Object?, 13
ILSA J. INT'L L. 1, 25 (1989); Adam Steinfeld, Note, Nuclear Objections: The Persistent
Objector and the Legality of the Use of Nuclear Weapons, 62 BROOK. L.R. 1635, 1640 (1996).

This position has also been taken by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. See
Domingues v. United States, Case 12.285, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 62/02,
OEA/Ser.L.IV.II. 117, doc. 1, rev. 1,1 49 (2002). Admittedly, the apparent fact that persistent
objectors will nonetheless be bound by peremptory norms does not confirm that silence is
inadequate to contribute to the formation of a rule of jus cogens, but if states are unable to
exempt themselves from a peremptory norm through objection, this would seem conceptually
logical. For a contrary view, however, see Nieto-Navia, supra note 137, at 612.
Christenson, supra note 8, at 587.
200.
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willing to affirm the peremptory nature of the rule, for whatever reason.
The fact that endorsement of the peremptory status of the prohibition is
sporadic in the small amount of practice herein examined indicates that
there needs to be a more detailed review of the state practice on this issue. The aim of this Section has merely been to highlight that the
pervading assumption that states have accepted the prohibition as jus
cogens needs to be more rigorously tested. The only way to reach a firm
conclusion on this question is through an extensive and systematic survey of state practice. Unfortunately, such a survey is beyond the scope of
this Article.
CONCLUSION
This Article has set out a number of problems with the conclusion,
uncritically reached by so many, that the prohibition of the use of force
is a jus cogens norm. It was first argued that the conjoined nature of the
prohibition of the use of force with the prohibition of the threat of force
in Article 2(4) leads to difficulties, given that the ban on the threat of
force is clearly not peremptory in character.
A more fundamental issue was then examined, that of the exceptions
to the general prohibition. Given that these exceptions are universally
accepted, it is impossible to conclude that the prohibition is, in itself,
peremptory. Thus, if one is to hold that the prohibition is jus cogens, a
suitable norm must be constructed to take into account the right of selfdefense and Security Council authorized collective security actions. Yet
any attempt to formulate such a norm is problematic given that certain
aspects of the jus ad bellum are clearly not peremptory, while other rules
must be for the norm to function. As such, the selection of rules for the
norm is a difficult process, and the number of interrelated rules involved
makes any norm constructed overly long and unclear. Adding to this lack
of clarity is the fact that many of the rules that must necessarily form
part of the peremptory norm are themselves uncertain in terms of content
or scope.
This Article then highlighted that the restrictive nature of the jus cogens framework does not seem to fit with the reality of the development
of the law on the use of force. Examples of current arguable shifts in
customary international law-self-defense against non-state actors and
cyber-attacks-were used to demonstrate the problem of a "frozen" jus
ad bellum.

Finally, it has been argued that the state practice in accepting the
prohibition of the use of force as peremptory is perhaps not as clear as
the majority of scholars assume, although it is acknowledged that the
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brief study of the state practice conducted here does not establish a conclusive position on the issue.
Now, one might reasonably ask: Why does all this matter? The concerns expressed here could well be regarded as boiling down to a single
issue of semantics. If the prohibition of the use of force is accepted by
all states prima facie, and applies universally, what difference does it
make whether the norm is labeled "jus cogens" or not? It is unlawful to
use force if the peremptory character of the rule is accepted, but then, it
is also unlawful if it is not.20 1
It is worth keeping in mind that the importance of the peremptory
status (or lack thereof) of any given rule can be overstated. Nonetheless,
a jus cogens norm potentially has an additional "compliance pull"202 to it.
The widespread acceptance of the jus cogens concept means that states
are more likely to take special note of peremptory norms and will potentially comply with them more often than with other rules. More
practically, a jus cogens rule does not merely find contrary practice unlawful, it voids the formation of new contrary norms (take, as an
example in this context, "pacts of aggression" of the sort once common)
ab initio.203 Of course, again, whether these implications of peremptory
status are seen as "good" depends on one's views as to the desirability
and functionality of thejus cogens project in international law.
It is, however, enough to say that if one takes the view that jus
cogens plays, or can play, a positive role in securing world orderstrengthening and protecting fundamental values, as well as restraining
unchecked power-then it is surely desirable that any purported jus cogens norms are clear, identifiable, and properly constituted. If one
subscribes to the desirability of value-based "supernorms" in the international system, then the prohibition of the use of force would surely be a
norm that one would want to ascribe such a character to given that the
use of military force invariably involves death and destruction-a factor
one should never lose sight of.'" The problems highlighted in this Article
have implications for the legitimacy of that rule, and thus its compliance
pull, at least in a relative sense when it is found to be in opposition to
other, potentially less "fundamental," norms.
Conversely, if one takes the view that jus cogens norms represent a
creeping imposition of a particular value-set and an unwarranted and
dangerous erosion of state sovereignty, it is equally desirable that the
peremptory status of the prohibition be properly tested and critiqued. For
DINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 100.
On the concept of a norm's "compliance pull,' see generally
THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990).
DINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 100-02.
203.
See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
204.
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those that argue against the "relative normativity,20 of rules within the
international legal system, the analysis of the peremptory status of the
prohibition of the use of force herein may usefully highlight more
pervading problems inherent in the jus cogens concept.
Thus, this Article leaves it to the reader to take his or her own view
as to the utility of its critique. Ultimately, this is because neither "desirability" nor "undesirability" have any legally constituting effect with
regard to the creation of jus cogens norms. As Barnidge notes:
Law does not spring into being, in a binding sense, simply
because one can argue ad nauseam as to the particular norm's
purported value, moral and ethical pedigree, or public policy
purchase. Article 53's test for a jus cogens norm is explicit . . .
No mention is made, nor is a requirement set, as to such a
norm's fidelity to one's own sense of values, morality and ethics,
and public policy, whatever those may be.206
For all of jus cogens' natural law gloss, the concept remains
grounded in positivist international law.20' Indeed, it must remain so if it
is to have any credibility or weight in a system that, for better or worse,
remains primarily premised on state consent. For a norm to be seen as a
rule of jus cogens, it must meet certain positivist criteria. Without entirely excluding the possibility that the prohibition of the use of force is a
peremptory norm, this Article has aimed to highlight that the rule's jus
cogens status-when tested against these criteria-is extremely problematic. At the very least, it must be said that the widespread uncritical
acceptance of the prohibition's peremptory nature is concerning, particularly as the norm being discussed here is one that forms a cornerstone of
the modern international legal system.
The peremptory status of the prohibition of the use of force requires
extensive further investigation. The problems raised in this Article must
be examined in more detail-and ultimately overcome-if the norm is to
be properly considered a peremptory one.

205.
206.
207.

This phrase was famously adopted by Weil, supra note 8.
Barnidge, supra note 8, at 205.
Nieto-Navia, supra note 137, at 602.

